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Abstract

This study explores a two-step procedure for assessing defense acquisition
program cost growth using historical data. Specifically, we seek to predict whether a
program will experience cost growth and, if applicable, how much costs will increase.
We compile programmatic data from the Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) between
1990 and 2000 for programs from all defense departments. We focus our analysis on cost
growth in research and development dollars for the Engineering Manufacturing
Development phase of acquisition. We further limit our study to only one of the seven
SAR categories of cost growth - engineering cost growth. We explore the use of logistic
regression in cost analysis to predict whether cost growth will occur. Using this
methodology, we produce a statistically significant model that accurately predicts
approximately 70 percent of our validation data. For those programs that have cost
growth, we use a multiple regression model (an adjusted R of 0.4645), with a natural log
transformation, to predict the expected amount of cost growth. We discover the two-step
logistic and multiple regression approach produces desirable results. Finally, we find
schedule variables to have the most predictive ability from the 78 candidate independent
variables analyzed.

XI

ESTIMATING ENGINEERING COST RISK USING LOGISTIC AND
MULTIPLE REGRESSION

I. Introduction

General Issue
The cost growth that major weapon systems incur throughout their acquisition life
cycles concerns those who work in the acquisition environment. A 1993 study by RAND
cites that by the time a system completes the production and fielding phase of acquisition,
Department of Defense (DoD) Acquisition Category (ACAT) 1 programs historically
experience an average cost growth of approximately 20 percent from initial estimates
(Drezner, 1993:xiii).
Cost growth in major weapon system programs negatively impacts DoD, the
country, and depending on the contract type, the DoD contractors involved. To
successfully contain cost growth, program managers must carefully plan their program,
coordinating with all stakeholders so that the plan developed encompasses all aspects of
the user's needs. The more carefully considered and better coordinated the plan,
arguably the less cost growth will occur. In support of this proposition, RAND notes that
smaller DoD programs tend to actuate higher percentage cost growth than their larger
counterparts; RAND cites as possible reason for this phenomenon the lower level of
management scrutiny placed on smaller dollar value programs (Drezner, 1993:xii).

1

Aside from containing cost growth, DoD managers must also concern themselves
with accurately identifying those risks related to potential cost increases in the program
cost estimates. Managers can reduce measured cost growth by more accurately assigning
dollar values to known risks, thereby increasing the accuracy of the baseline figure from
which DoD measures cost growth. The cost estimating community supports management
in this arena by doing its best to assign appropriate dollar amounts to the programspecific risk factors, then aggregating these dollar amounts into the cost estimate.
Specific Issue
Often, cost estimators use subjective means for assigning dollar amounts to risk
factors, which they then use to incorporate estimated cost growth within the budget
baseline estimate. Typically, a cost estimator solicits expert opinions on the overall risk
levels of different aspects of a program and then uses a heuristic to apply dollar amounts
to those risk values. A more objective method for assigning dollar values to risk factors
involves a careful analysis of historical data. This approach requires a cost analyst to
understand relationships between program attributes and observed cost growth. In such
an approach, it might behoove the estimator to split cost growth into various categories to
examine whether different types of cost growth have distinct sets of predictors.
Statistical regression techniques prove useful in determining such relationships, and this
research applies such techniques to find predictors of cost growth.
Scope and Limitations of the Study
The Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) are a collection of individual program
reports that (among other things) capture all of the cost variances on many major defense

acquisition programs. These reports provide an adequate data source from which to
analyze cost growth. Due to both the accessibility and the detail of the SARs, we use
them to build a database for our research. The SARs separate program cost variance into
seven categories: Economic, Quantity, Estimating, Engineering, Schedule, Support, and
Other (Drezner, 1993:7). The demarcation of these seven components allows for a
standardized comparison of variances across programs, and a more meticulous analysis of
cost growth. The SARs also contain a variety of other programmatic details that lend to
their usefulness in a detailed analysis of cost growth. In general, these details include
major schedule milestone dates, physical and performance characteristics, and contractual
information. As with other databases, our SAR database has limitations, but none that
preclude its use for this research.
In this study, we measure cost growth as a percentage increase in cost from the
Development Estimate (DE) as recorded in the SAR format. We limit our study to cost
growth in the Research and Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) accounts during
the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase of acquisition. We
further scope our effort to only consider one of the seven categories of cost variances as
delineated in the SAR reports - cost variances due to engineering changes. This category
includes cost growth that occurs as a result of physical changes in the end item (Knoche,
2001:22; Drezner, 1993:7). Thus, we only explain one piece of the cost-growth puzzle,
but prepare the way for potential completion of this puzzle with our compilation of
information on all other categories of cost growth within our database and through our
validation of methodologies.

For reasons of time constraints and of data currency, the study includes only
programs that use the DE as the baseline estimate and programs whose Engineering
Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase of acquisition falls within the period 19902000. We only use one SAR per program and choose the most recent available. In many
cases, the most recent DE-based SAR available is the last SAR of the EMD phase of
acquisition. Quirks exist in the SAR data that further limit the research (e.g. security
classification, etc.) Chapter III addresses many of these limitations in depth. Finally, the
DE may already include some unknown budget for risk, which limits the interpretation of
the results of this research.
Past research looks at cost growth within the DoD from a macro perspective.
High-level decision-makers use these studies for macro-level reasons, such as finding
general trends in overall cost growth. As such, much of the past research has a
descriptive rather than an inferential statistical focus. Though ours is an inferential study,
we use these historical studies to help us find candidate predictor variables for cost
growth. We find only a few historical studies that apply multiple regression, and none
consider logistic regression techniques. Our study explores several new frontiers as we
investigate a newly created database, compile an extensive list of candidate predictor
variables derived from past research, forge a unique approach at analysis with both
logistic and multiple regression, and address cost growth in a new way - at the constituent
level.

Research Objectives
This study has three main objectives. First, the study explores the utility of
logistic regression in finding predictors of engineering cost growth. To our knowledge,
no researcher has explored the use of logistic regression in cost analysis before.
Specifically, we use logistic regression to determine if certain program characteristics
predict whether a program experiences engineering cost growth in the RDT&E budget
during the EMD phase of development. Logistic regression differs from multiple
regression in that it predicts a binary response. In our case the binary response is: Does
a program experience cost growth, Yes or No? Second, the study seeks to find predictors
of the degree to which cost growth occurs. We use multiple regression to determine if
certain program characteristics predict the amount of engineering cost growth in the
RDT&E budget in the EMD phase of development. Lastly, we seek to discover the
nature of these predictive relationships such that one may use the formulas to predict
whether a program will have cost growth and to predict point and range estimates of the
percent of engineering cost growth in the RDT&E budget in the EMD phase of program
development.
Chapter Summary
This study attempts to leverage off past cost growth research to create models that
meet the needs of the financial management community to better estimate risk in dollar
terms according to program characteristics. To develop these models, we perform
logistic and multiple regressions on data from programs recorded in the SARs over the
past decade. The study involves only engineering cost growth in the RDT&E budget as

measured from the DE of the program. While managers must deal with cost growth in
many ways, this study seeks to reduce measured cost growth by helping cost estimators
more accurately estimate cost growth early in the program.

II. Literature Review

Chapter Overview
This chapter provides an overview of the research involving cost growth. We
first describe the overall acquisition, cost-estimating, and risk assessment environment,
then follow with details of previous studies that relate to the topic of the study at hand.
From the information gathered in this chapter, we develop a historical and logical
framework from which to begin building predictive regression models.
The Acquisition Environment
Peter Woodward, in his thesis, mentions factors in the acquisition program
management environment that may cause a program to overrun. Woodward talks of the
constrictive nature of the DoD acquisition funding environment, "For example, it is
impossible to take advantage of quantity buys and other cost-saving techniques when
program managers are required to obligate all their funds within a year or two of their
appropriation" (Woodward, 1983:106). Woodward alludes to funding rules that require
the obligation (putting funds on a contract) of research and development funds within a
period of two years and the obligation of procurement funds within a period of three
years. Woodward further states, "It is also difficult to obtain these cost savings when a
manager does not even know for certain whether his program funding will be cut from
one year to the next" (Woodward, 1983:106). Program managers that fail to obligate
funds within these time windows face dangers that range from chastisement and program
restructure to loss of funding and program cancellation. In fact, even when a program

manager manages his program perfectly, upper management might choose to sacrifice his
program in order to bail out another higher priority program that has funding problems.
One can see that in this environment, as program schedules slip, program managers face
increasing pressure to sacrifice cost-effectiveness for expediency.
In a cost growth study, one must consider the diversity of programs that exist
within the acquisition environment. The DoD Manual Cost Analysis Guidance and
Procedures lists the following as categories of Defense Acquisition Systems: "Aircraft,
Engines, Missiles, Ships, Tanks and Trucks, Data Automation/ADPE, and Electronics."
The manual further divides electronics into the following four subcategories: "Radar,
Communications, Satellite, EW [electronic warfare]" (Department of Defense, 1992:1314). Then, the manual details types of "key system characteristics and performance
parameters" that prove useful in estimating each particular category of acquisition
(Department of Defense, 1992:13-14). This categorization hints that heterogeneity
characterizes DoD acquisition cost estimating such that different types of systems have
different drivers of cost behavior. Cost growth as measured from the Development
Estimate for different categories of acquisition systems may also have this heterogeneous
properly.
The Cost Estimating Environment
Cost growth has proven a significant problem for some time for program offices.
During the early eighties, the Reagan administration recognizes two ways to control the
problem of cost growth. "Despite some initial steps, controlling cost growth remains a
major problem. The solution must include more realistic estimates accurately reflecting

future costs and difficult choices to reduce requirements when costs grow" (Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense, 1981:4). According to this quote, creating estimates that are
more realistic provides one way of controlling cost growth. Cost/requirements tradeoffs
provide a second way to control cost growth. The second method has since come into
vogue through the "cost as an independent variable" or CAIV approach to program
management (Ayres, 2000:3). In CAIV, cost takes on greater importance when making
programmatic decisions. This more than likely has led to successful cost control,
although quantifying that success proves elusive. This research seeks to enhance the first
method of cost control, "more realistic estimates."
High-level DoD management personnel continue to concern themselves with cost
growth. In December of 2000, Air Force experts brief the Chief of Staff of the Air Force
on their findings in a focused cost growth study of 16 current AC AT 1 programs. The
study observes cost growth (as recorded in the SARs) that occurs over the years 19971999 and ignores cost decreases. This study finds that cost growth from quantity and
schedule changes accounts for 32 percent and 24 percent of the cost growth (respectively)
in these 16 programs (Westgate, 2000:3). Estimating changes account for 20 percent of
the growth; engineering changes account for 17 percent of the growth; and changes in
support costs account for seven percent of the total cost growth. This study shows that
the overwhelming majority of cost growth results from budget decisions and
requirements changes. These decisions and changes come from Air Force Headquarters,
DoD Headquarters, or Congress. In many of these programs, programmatic problems
seem to instigate these budget decisions and requirement changes (Westgate, 2000:6).

Cost growth for the 16 programs over the three-year period totals 12 percent ($20.2
billion) (Westgate, 2000:14).
The researchers offer several recommendations to help control cost growth. To
gain better visibility into the "cost of delay" that occurs when production rates change
due to quantity or schedule changes, the researchers suggest including those costs in the
quantity or schedule variances in the SAR (Westgate, 2000:16). The visibility of the cost
of making quantity or schedule changes will help decision-makers avoid such changes
when the cost exceeds the supposed benefits.
The researchers recognize that high cost growth results not only from poor
visibility of cause-effect relationships, but also in the limiting of decision-makers'
options. Along this vane, the researchers recommend that headquarters "limit fenced
modernization dollars to preclude funding instability" (Westgate, 2000: 16). 'Fencing'
(i.e. restricting the use of dollars) minimizes flexibility, and decision-makers tend to
make poorer funding decisions in this inflexible funding environment, because fewer
options exist which they can pursue.
As a third recommendation, the researchers suggest that the Air Force "require
highest priority projects to be estimated and funded at a higher confidence level"
(Westgate, 2000: 16). This suggestion alludes to the practice of calculating and
quantifying cost risk within the weapon system cost estimate used to produce the budget
profile. In this process, estimators use a probability distribution to determine the
probability of occurrence and impact of events that might increase cost. These
researchers advocate using some level of confidence above 50 percent to ensure that the
top priority programs receive the funding they need without having to 'rob' from other
10

programs. This may prove especially useful for high dollar programs, where a small
percent increase can mean a drastic evaporation of funding.
The researchers espouse a fourth recommendation that invites criticism: the
rewarding of program managers for cost performance (Westgate, 2000: 16). From
strictly a cost perspective this incentive makes sense, but some would argue that without
proper care in instituting such a policy, the result could be an imbalanced priority on cost
above performance and schedule to such a degree as to jeopardize the delivery of a
product that the war fighter needs within the appropriate timeframe.
Another suggestion by the team, that the Air Force "optimize program schedules
instead of subjecting to budget constraints," faces great resistance by program managers
under the current politics of the acquisition-funding environment (Westgate, 2000:17).
Once Congress approves a funding profile, many program managers would rather hold on
to what money they have in the years they have the money than risk trading their money
for money in a different year in order to gain possible cost savings. This results from the
uncertainty inherent in the funding environment stemming from stories of program
managers who gave up funding in one year expecting a return of funds in the next, but
who failed to receive the promised funds.
Finally, the research team recommends to the Chief of Staff that he "create an
integrated system to capture standard budget, execution and performance data across
[the] AF Modernization Program" (Westgate, 2000: 17). This recommendation reiterates
the need to better capture, standardize, and disseminate information to make smarter
decisions that should result in minimized cost growth. In summary, this study identifies
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cost growth as a problem visible to the highest levels of Air Force leadership, and it
identifies possible ways to better control the problem.
Risk and Uncertainty in Cost Estimating
Documenting Uncertainty in Estimates
The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Cost Analysis Improvement Group
(CAIG) gives guidelines for documenting cost estimating uncertainty for DoD system
acquisition programs. First, they mandate that "areas of cost estimating uncertainty will
be identified and quantified" (Department of Defense, 1992:22). Programs must
document this uncertainty in the Cost Analysis Requirements Document (CARD).
Second, the CAIG prescribes "the use of probability distributions or ranges of cost" to
quantify uncertainty (Department of Defense, 1992:22). Third, they ask that the
uncertainty estimated be "attributable to estimating errors" (Department of Defense,
1992:22). They give the following examples:
...uncertainty inherent with estimating costs based on assumed values of
independent variables outside data base ranges, and uncertainty attributed
to other factors, such as performance and weight characteristics, new
technology, manufacturing initiatives, inventory objectives, schedules, and
financial condition of the contractor... (Department of Defense, 1992:22)
In addition to uncertainty, the DoD procedures also provide for the estimation of
contingencies and sensitivity analysis. For contingencies, the manual gives the estimator
the option to include a contingency amount or to exclude such an amount. If the
estimator includes an amount for contingencies, he must give the reason for the
contingency estimate as well as the rationale for the estimate. In addition, he must
"include an assessment of the likelihood that the circumstances requiring the contingency
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will occur" (Department of Defense, 1992:22). This of course, implies the association of
a probability distribution with such circumstances.
The Nature of Risk Analysis
Within the cost estimating community, differing opinions exist as to the meanings
of risk and uncertainty. Rather than attempting to champion one definition over another,
this paragraph seeks only to substantiate a particular distinction between risk and
uncertainty to serve as a common starting point for discussion of risk analysis in this
paper. Webster's defines risk as "the possibility of loss or injury," and defines
'uncertainty' as "the quality or state of being uncertain." To avoid defining a word with a
form of itself, one must again search the dictionary to find that 'uncertain' means "not
certain to occur," or "not known beyond doubt." Thus, from these definitions, one can
infer that both risk and uncertainty share within their meanings the idea of 'questionable
occurrence'. However, the definition of'risk' adds to that 'questionable occurrence' the
aspect of 'harm' through the words, "loss or injury." Thus, for the purpose of this paper,
'risk' involves both 'questionable occurrence' and 'harm,' while 'uncertainty' simply
embodies 'questionable occurrence' within its definition.
The DoD cost estimating community considers cost growth as the "increase in
cost of a system from inception to completion," and it considers cost risk as "the funds
set aside to cover predicted cost growth" (Coleman, 2000:3). Thus, the cost risk
represents the projected dollar amounts associated with risk, while the cost growth
represents the incurred dollar amounts associated with the risk (Coleman, 2000:3).
The AFMC Financial Management Handbook gives the Air Force perspective on
risk analysis:
13

Cost estimating deals with uncertainty. What the analyst attempts to do is
to describe in the best terms possible the probability distribution of the
cost event in the future. One value for the cost estimate is the result of one
prediction ofthat future event. Risk Analysis is a careful consideration of
the areas of uncertainty associated with future events. The preferred
common denominator for translating risk identified in the program is
dollars. The detailed analysis of the risk to the program leads to better
information for Air Force and other Government decision makers.
(AFMC Financial Management Handbook, 2001:11-12)
Thus, risk analysis addresses the range of possible outcomes and their probabilities. The
handbook distinguishes program risk as "the uncertainties and consequences of future
events that may affect a program" (AFMC Financial Management Handbook, 2001:1112).
The AFMC Financial Management Handbook recognizes three parameters for
risk: technical, schedule, and cost risk. The handbook suggests that the estimator
estimate the risk in these areas in terms of dollars and establish a probability distribution
for each area. The program manager must decide from these distributions which number
to use as the most appropriate number to add as part of the final cost estimate. All
services use similar procedures, such that each service uses some logical method to assess
risk in different areas of a program and quantify that risk within their estimates.
The handbook mentions three methods for handling risk analysis: a posteriori, a
priori, and subjective judgment:
1) The first method, a posteriori, or "after the fact" relationship to
past events (direct knowledge), is based on some previous
occurrence such as the cost outcome of previous projects
conducted by the organization. If enough samples from the past
history (the population) are drawn, the probability of the next event
occurring in a particular way may be estimated. A complex
methodology like Monte Carlo simulation may also be used. The
Monte Carlo simulation is conducted where the analyst determines
the probability of future events by using an experimental model to
14

approximate expected actual conditions. Such a model is
fashioned from previous histories of similar projects.
2) Sometimes a distribution of possible outcomes for an event is not
based on experience or sampling but on a priori, or "before the
fact" theoretical probability distribution. The use of the closeness
of the assumptions used in developing the theoretical distribution
is to the real world situation being analyzed.
3) Many times an analyst will have to use a subjective judgment
(indirect knowledge) in estimating probability. This approach
relies on the experience and judgment of one or more people to
create the estimated probability distribution. The result is known
as a subjective probability. A distribution estimate is an analysis
by one or more informed persons of the relative likelihood of
particular outcomes of an event occurring. Distribution estimates
are subjective. An example of this approach is the Delphi method.
(AFMC Financial Management Handbook, 2001:11-12)
Cost estimates in the SAR database may already include some dollar amounts within
their budgets for risk. Program offices generally include amounts for risk within their
budget submissions; however, higher-level reviews frequently result in removal of risk
dollars from estimates.
Risk Assessment Methods
Several methods of risk assessment exist in the military cost estimating
community. Use of different methods depends on the type of risk estimated, the level of
detail needed in the estimate, the accuracy needed in the estimate, the timeframe within
which the estimator has to complete the estimate, the skill of the estimator, the data and
tools available to the estimator, and any office policies directing estimating practices.
In 1993, the RAND Corporation produces a study on DoD acquisition program
cost growth. This study reiterates the need for cost risk-estimation techniques. In this
study, the researchers make the following statement: "Unfortunately, no proven method
exists to identify overly optimistic or pessimistic cost estimates at the different stages of a
15

development program" (Drezner, 1993: 1). The RAND researchers also state, "Both
overruns and underruns reduce the quality of resource allocation decisions" (Drezner,
1993: 1). Thus, the challenge exists in the form of creating a method for program offices
to model cost overruns and underruns and incorporate such amounts in cost estimates.
Although both cost overruns and underruns adversely affect successful program
management, the RAND study shows that estimates are systematically biased low.
Therefore, systems managers face the dangers of cost overruns more often than the
danger of cost underruns. The authors of the study point out the dangers of a downward
bias in cost estimating:
Systematic bias can lead to erratic acquisition decisions (e.g., more start
and continuation decisions) that contribute to problems later in the system
life cycle, such as the "bow wave" phenomena in which too many
programs reach high funding levels at the same time: reduction in
operation and support accounts to compensate for increases in the
development and procurement accounts and quantity reductions that affect
force structure plans and capabilities. (Drezner, 1993: 2)
Carlucci Initiatives Recognize the Need for a Method
In 1981, Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci implements the Carlucci
initiatives that seek to reform DoD program management. Among the 31 initiatives, two
seek to improve the budgeting function by directing cost estimators to account for
technological and other risk factors in their estimates (Woodward, 1983:6). To
implement this policy, the Office of the Secretary of Defense encourages the use of the
Total Risk Assessing Cost Estimate (TRACE) methodology as a possible means for
incorporating risk into estimates to account for possible cost growth (Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense, 1981:11-1). Peter Woodward in his thesis addressing funds
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management in the face of risk and uncertainty, appropriately characterizes the challenge
of creating an estimate for program risk (management reserve):
Thus, the hidden issue concerning management reserve is not the use of
such a reserve itself, but the perception that Congress and higher-level
management have of a service's program to accurately manage risk and
uncertainty without exceeding the budget constraints as defined in the
program. In order to achieve this, more objective statistical techniques
can be used to derive the baseline cost estimate. Therefore, the present
system of submitting a point cost estimate (which includes fixed program
milestones, fixed schedule, and fixed performance parameters) must be
modified so that additional information gained as the program progresses
can be used to get the necessary funds for its completion. At present, once
a point estimate is submitted, it becomes the controlling guideline
throughout the life of the program. (Woodward, 1983:105)
In this passage, Woodward recognizes the power of statistical techniques to
achieve objective estimates for management reserves. Woodward also recognizes that
such a technique must have the flexibility to apply to different stages in the program life
cycle. A technique that can achieve this objectivity and flexibility, Woodward claims,
would not only produce more accurate estimates, but also give Congress and the
Executive Branch more confidence in the program office's ability to manage its funding
properly, presumably making management reserves less susceptible to retraction.
Types of Risk Methods
Figure 1 shows the different risk assessment techniques recognized by the
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) cost estimating community. The chart
shows how the "degree of precision" needed in an estimate drives the type of estimate
used: as the degree of precision needed increases, the estimate techniques used become
more detailed and difficult (Coleman, 2000:4).
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Risk Assessment Techniques
liled Network & Risk Assessment (Months)
sort-Opinion Based (Months)

'A Detailed Monte Carlo (each C/WBS line item)

(Days)

Bottom Line Monte Carlo/Bottom Line Range/Method of Moments (Hoyre)
Add a Risk Factor/Percentage (Minutes)

Detail & Difficulty

Figure 1. Risk Assessment Techniques (Coleman, 2000:4-9)
Starting from the most difficult and most precise end of the spectrum, the Detailed
Network and Risk Assessment technique requires a very detailed schedule and task
breakout. This method assigns either beta or triangular distributions to the schedule item
durations to create a stochastic model from which to estimate the risk of a schedule slip.
The estimator uses the Monte Carlo Simulation method to estimate the cost (Coleman,
2000:4-9).
The Expert-Opinion-Based technique represents the next level of detail down
from the network technique. This method relies on surveys of experts to determine the
possible distributions of Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) item costs. This method also
uses Monte Carlo simulation to estimate a range of possible costs. It relies on the
abilities of the experts to accurately assess the situation in light of their past experiences;

"the problem is whether technical experts have any real sense of how much things cost,
or how much costs can rise" (Coleman, 2000:12).
The technique of the next difficulty level down is the Detailed Monte Carlo
Simulation for "each C/WBS line item," where C/WBS is the Cost or Work Breakdown
Structure of the program (Coleman, 2000:4). Although the previous two methods use
Monte Carlo Simulation, this method differs from the previous two in that it relies on
historical databases of cost and other programmatic information from which to develop
probability distributions of cost outcomes (Coleman, 2000:16). This method quickens
the process by avoiding lengthy surveys or PERT analyses, but its weakness lies in the
applicability and currency of the data used in the database (Coleman, 2000:17). Despite
these weaknesses, this method gives a reasonable amount of accuracy for the amount of
time that an estimator puts into it, as Figure 1 depicts (Coleman, 2000:4).
The Bottom Line Monte Carlo, Bottom Line Range, and Method of Moments
techniques in Figure 1 represent estimating on a less detailed level (Coleman, 2000:4).
These methods may use Monte Carlo Simulation, but on higher levels of the WBS.
These methods might use a limited database or analogy methodology to determine risk
estimates, or they might use expert opinion to determine risk estimates. The least precise
and easiest technique, "Add a Risk Factor/Percentage," relies on technical expert
judgment to assign a high-level, subjective risk factor for the estimate (Coleman, 2000:4).
Monte Carlo Simulation
Arguably, the most favored method for estimating uncertainty, Monte Carlo
Simulation provides a capability to the cost estimator that adds rigor to subjective
estimates. Monte Carlo software exists that ties the probability distributions for multiple
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programmatic cost risk items to those items within the cost estimate. The software
requires that the estimator define the probability distribution for each of the risk items,
and gives the estimator considerable amount of flexibility in terms of the choice of
probability distributions. The estimator can enter the parameters of a probability
distribution based on either subjective judgments or a historical database. Once the
estimator specifies the distributions for each risk item, the software runs the Monte Carlo
Simulation. This simulation randomly generates results for each risk item specified,
consistent with the assigned probability distributions. The software combines the results
to display the overall program cost risk. This process repeats for a user-determined
number of iterations, such that an overall cost risk distribution results. In such a fashion,
the estimator finds a point estimate and a range of possibilities with their associated
probabilities of occurrence (Coleman, 2000:5).
Past Research in Cost Growth
Before analyzing the data, we consider logical relationships in the program
management environment that might explain cost growth. Past research helps in the
search for explanations for cost growth. In this section, we describe various studies that
address cost growth.
RAND Study (2001)
In a study in support of the Joint Strike Fighter program, RAND studies the effect
of competition on the amount of cost growth that occurs in both the RDT&E and
procurement budgets (Birkler, 2001:74). The researchers analyze 14 programs that use
competitive strategies and 44 programs that do not use competitive strategies (Birkler,
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2001:74). They find that "the results are mixed and the differences between the
competitive and noncompetitive development [and procurement] CGFs (cost growth
factors) are not statistically significant at the 10-percent level" (Birkler, 2001:80).
Although it might prove enlightening to explore competitive programs versus noncompetetive programs in a multiple regression study of the cost growth associated with
engineering changes, we do not pursue that course of analysis in this study, largely due to
unavailability of the required data.
BMDO Study
A recent BMDO cost growth study provides insight into the nature of cost growth.
Using an internal BMDO database of programs (created from a subset of the SAR
database), BMDO finds that RDT&E cost growth averages 21 percent while that of
production averages 19 percent (Coleman, 2000:19). The study also shows that from
seven to 16 percent of programs complete at or below the target cost (see Figure 2)
(Coleman, 2000:19). From Figure 2, it appears at first glance that the lower the dollar
value of a program, the greater the likelihood of a large cost growth factor. The author
does not provide any statistical tests to explore this possibility, but the graph at least does
not provide evidence against the idea.
The researchers of BMDO compare their cost growth results with past studies
using the SAR database, evidencing a general commonality of cost growth factors (see
Table 1) (Coleman, 2000:20). Differences in the results possibly stem from differences
in the subsets of the SAR data used and differences in the methods used (Coleman,
2000:20). The study shows evidence of bias in cost risk estimates as described in the
following sentences.
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Figure 2. Historical Cost Growth (Coleman, 2000:19)
As a program progresses, cost estimators revise their estimates to reflect realized
values of risk. The estimators reduce the amount of risk estimated and increase the cost
estimate in other areas to reflect this change. Under the assumption of unbiased risk
estimates, one would expect that realized risk would tend to equal the estimated risk on
average given a large sample. In fact, the study shows that the risk portion of the
estimate decreases at a slower rate than the rate of the rest of the estimate increases
(Coleman, 2000:22-23). This evidences a general trend of underestimating risk.
This study does not break down cost growth into its components. In addition, this
study does not distinguish cost growth by acquisition phase. Thus, we cannot specifically
tie the results of the BMDO study to the nature of engineering cost growth in EMD;
however, the study does give us general insight into predictors to pursue.

22

Table 1. Historical Cost Growth (Coleman, 2000:20)

Source
RAND 93
CAIG91
TASC 94
TASC 96
Christensen 99

Raw Average
S W Id Average
Tot I R&D I Prod I Tot I R&D I Prod
1.30
1.20
1.25
1.180
1.33
1.40
1.25
1.21
1.24
0.119
1.49
1.54
1.43
1.55
1.21
1.350
1.09
1.14

N

Dunn»
Prod

100+
27
20+
14

1.02

0.99
1.06

NAVA1R Study
NAVA1R presents its most recent study on cost growth at the 2001 DoD Cost
Analysis Symposium, corroborating some of the results of previous studies, and adding
new insight into cost growth. Their study assesses cost growth as reported in the SARs.
As part of their analysis, they explore the possible need for "cohort tracking" when
analyzing cost growth (Dameron, 2001:7). Webster's Collegiate Dictionary defines
"cohort" as "band or group." By "cohort tracking," the NAVA1R team refers to the
grouping of cost growth according to certain programmatic characteristics that relate to
common patterns of cost growth. The team divides program cost growth into five
categories or cohorts - RDT&E cost growth for programs with a planning estimate (PE)
and a development estimate (DE); RDT&E cost growth for programs with a DE only;
procurement cost growth for programs with a PE, a DE, and a production estimate (PdE);
procurement cost growth for programs with a DE and a PdE only; and procurement cost
growth for programs with a DE only (Dameron, 2001:10).
Cost estimators perform each of the three different possible estimates (PE, DE,
and PdE) at a different phase in the acquisition life cycle. The estimator performs a PE
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for a Milestone (MS) I review, the first action in the Program Definition Risk Reduction
(PDRR) phase. The estimator performs a DE for a MS II review, the first event in the
EMD phase of the acquisition life cycle. Finally, the estimator may or may not perform a
PdE (sometimes the DE suffices) for a MS III review, the first event in the procurement
phase of the acquisition life cycle. Not all programs use all three of the above-mentioned
program phases, and one discerns the program structure from the types of estimates used.
The NAVAIR team does not explicitly state, but we presume that they use the five
cohorts consisting of the different types of estimates to categorize the cost growth,
because the use of those mixes of cost estimates relate to different types of program
structures, which might represent distinct populations with distinct cost growth patterns.
After looking at 318 programs across all of DoD, the cohort study results show
that the PE and DE cohort has 30 percent RDT&E cost growth; the DE-only cohort has
25 percent RDT&E cost growth; the PE, DE, and PdE cohort has 35 percent procurement
cost growth; the DE and PdE cohort has 25 percent procurement cost growth; and the
DE-only cohort has 15 percent procurement cost growth. The sample sizes are 25, 140,
6, 53, and 94 respectively (Dameron, 2001:10). The NAVAIR group indicates that the
"results are very tentative," but suggests that differences might exist in cost growth from
one cohort to another. In particular, they point out that, in their study, "programs with a
PDRR phase have more growth" (Dameron, 2001:11).
The NAVAIR study also looks at cost growth correlations between program
phases and between the RDT&E and procurement appropriations. The study finds a
significant correlation between RDT&E cost growth in the PDRR phase and RDT&E
cost growth in the EMD phase and also finds "significant correlation between
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procurement growth during the EMD and production phases" (Dameron, 2001:14).
Finally, it finds a significant correlation between appropriations such that, during EMD,
when the RDT&E appropriation experiences cost growth, so does the procurement
appropriation (Dameron, 2001:14).
As a third area of study, the N AVA1R group analyzes how program size affects
cost growth. The team finds that the distributions of the high and low dollar programs
are identical; however, "there is a trend of more high end extrema in the smaller size
classes (though not statistically significant)" (Dameron, 2001:21). To explain the
difference in the extrema, they reason that, "high risk programs may be terminated earlier
if large, but tolerated if small" (Dameron, 2001:21). They find inferential statistics does
not support a significant difference in the cost growth of programs based on the size
parameters they study.
Next, NAVA1R studies the effects of the era in which an acquisition terminates
and the cost growth occurs. As for the data, the team uses "DoD programs with DE only
from the RAND 93 dataset, NAVA1R programs with DE only from the SAR 00 dataset,
and NAVA1R programs with DE only from the Contract dataset (RDT&E only)"
(Dameron, 2001:23). The team therefore has three separate data sets that they use, two of
their own compilation and the RAND 93 dataset. The group studies the effects of two
eras - pre-1986 and post-1986. They choose 1986 as a dividing point, because that year
marks the last year of the Reagan arms buildup (Dameron, 2001:23). The team performs
/-tests to determine if the two eras differ statistically. They find the following results:
•

RAND 93: The means of programs through 1986 and those after
1986 did show a statistical difference for RDT&E, but not for
procurement.
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•

SAR 00: The means of programs through 1986 and those after
1986 did show a statistical difference for procurement, but not for
RDT&E.

•

Contract: The means of programs through 1986 and those after
1986 did not show a statistical difference for RDT&E
(Dameron, 2001:31).

The team concludes that their "analysis supports a decline in CGF over time" (Dameron,
2001:32). They mention that these results differ from previous studies perhaps because
past studies have had too few data points in the newer era or because past studies have
made bad choices for era division dates (Dameron, 2001:32).
The NAVA1R team further compares RDT&E cost growth in small programs
(less than one billion dollars in RDT&E) as portrayed through the SAR 2000 data versus
the NAVA1R contract database. This analysis concludes that the results from the two
databases do not significantly differ (Dameron, 2001:34,38). They conclude that
potential exists to use either database to study cost growth.
As a final area of research, the NAVA1R group studies differences between
commodities and their relation to cost growth. The team looks at all three databases, but
limits the data to 20 RAND 93 programs, 11 SAR 00 programs, and 21 contract data
programs. They conclude that missile programs experience higher cost growth during
RDT&E than either electronic or aircraft programs. Again, the scope of the NAVA1R
study differs from the scope of our study, yet the study provides considerable insight into
possible predictors for our research.

26

IDA Study
The Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) performs an analysis on cost and
schedule growth of tactical missiles and tactical aircraft in 1994 with the goal of finding
patterns of cost growth and the reasons for the cost growth (Tyson, 1994:S-1). Within
the group of 20 tactical missiles investigated, the IDA group finds that, "Programs took
from 50 months to 137 months from Milestone II to initial operational capability"
(Tyson, 1994:S-2). The study finds that only two of the 20 programs stay within their
schedule, with one program slipping by as much as 180 percent, and that only two
programs stay within budget, while the two worst performers exceed their budgets by a
factor of two (Tyson, 1994:S-2). The researchers of IDA examine the characteristics of
the programs with the highest and lowest schedule and cost growth (see results in Table 2
and Table 3) (Tyson, 1994:S-2). From their study, they find that:
[Missile] programs that employed a high degree of concurrency, that had to be
dual-sourced for technical reasons or that were dual-sourced at less than full rate,
had high cost growth. In one case, the threat of competition appeared to reduce
costs. (Tyson, 1994:S-2)
The results from aircraft programs do not vary as much. The authors of the study
suggest closer management scrutiny and "protection from schedule stretch" as a reason
for the more consistent cost growth in aircraft programs (Tyson, 1994:S-2). Two aircraft
programs suffer from elongated production schedules, but do not experience high
production cost growth as a result. The authors theorize that generally, stretching out the
production program incites cost growth; however, in both of these aircraft cases the
existence of other DoD contracts help cushion the impact of the adjusted schedules. The
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authors identify the F/A-18 as the program with the highest cost growth. They theorize
that late engineering changes incite the high cost growth (Tyson, 1994:S-2).
Table 2. Characteristics of Programs with High and Low Schedule Growth in
Development (Tyson, 1994:S-3)
Program
Um Growth
TOW 2

Ftacent^p
HWWtlt

Sidewinder &IM-9M

0%
1%

MLRS

m

High Gmwtk
Phoenix AIM-54A

Maverick AGM-fiSWO

C'hiiraclenslic!.
Petla*~om system
FöHöW-OM system to iiilfUl goals of AJM«9L
Learned from ujBeaiisiie estimate of prior system

Urgent fregtam
GMHjMütiw prototype
R^uirwiiefiisftetaiiife

teaff made in dvor uf schedule

94%

FroMenu resolved in development, not allowed to spill ww in» production
Testing delays
Delajs in aircraft plaifoftii

W%

Funding cut slewed d#v^|*j|wtiefitt nlfowed iKfen^logj l# eaieb ugt
Prototype
Vigwotis tesilof program

AMRAAM

129%

Fnnoiype thawed infeisifellftj ettfpnach
Higii {.onciutenLy. urgen! prdgriun
Rustled issuing

Sidewinder AIM-9L

148%

Urgent pwJgpMn, with fiy-befcire-ljyy strategy
Technical proWents» »ilk increased dewlopment quantity
Joint $w
protpvm, with technical di:

Sparrow AIM-7F

I80%

UwSefestinMtieii of technical difRcully (vacuum tube: to solid state)
Vigorous testing
jrini

The study considers whether modification programs have lower cost growth than
new start programs, and the results are as follows. The researchers find that the one
aircraft in their sample that exists as a modification of a previous version of the aircraft
does in fact experience low cost growth. The team finds that missile modification
programs vary greatly in the amount of cost growth they experience. They cite the fact
that most missile modifications affect the expensive guidance and control system of the
missile as a possible reason for this inconsistency in missile modification program cost
growth (Tyson, 1994:S-5).
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Table 3. Characteristics of Programs with Low and High Cost Growth in Total
Program (Tyson, 1994:S-4)
ftogaiti
low Growth
MLRS

Maverick AGM-65A

ChapMeriaig
-10%

!*

Competitive prototype
Requirement lowered because of time urgency
Mulityear procurement, low streich
Total package procurement with low concurrency
Vigorous testing program
Low stretch

TOW 2

•4»

Urgent modification program
Foreign Military Sales
Low stretch

Sidewinder AJM-9M

10%

Leaned from schedule problems in A1M-9L program
Urgent program«, took its lumps in development
Low stretch

84%

Prototype showed infeasib> ity of approach
High concurrency, rushed testing
Stretched program, dual-sourdr.g

Phoenix A1M-54C

89*

High concurrency
Dual-source«) for technics
Five yea« qualifying for two years of competition
Needed funding for next

Sparrow A1M-7M

100%

Competitive prototype, tow cost growth in development
Needed funding for next generation

Sidewinder AIM-9L

123%

Crash program
DuaKsourced for technical reasons
Production streich

High Growth
AMRAAM

The researchers further find that the urgency of the program, the difficulty of the
technology, the amount of concurrency, and the degree of testing all seem to affect cost
growth in those programs studied (Tyson, 1994:S-5). From these results, the IDA
researchers discover a relationship between cost growth and schedule growth in both the
development and the production phases (Tyson, 1994:S-5). They find that quantity
increases during development largely drive development schedule growth. The authors
mention "the need to produce more items for testing than planned" as the reason for the
increase in quantity (Tyson, 1994:S-6). The most obvious reason for producing more
testing units is the need to repeat a failed test. Test failure, then, seems a reasonable
candidate driver of schedule slip, and within the reasons for test failure (which IDA does
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not explore in depth, and nor shall we) might lie clues to program characteristics that
would serve as good candidates for predictors of development schedule growth. The
study also finds that whether a missile is an intercept missile and the length of the
original schedule prove useful predictors of development schedule growth. From these
relationships, the researchers go on to discover that, "Total program cost growth was
related to total schedule growth, planned unit cost, and an intercept missile dummy
variable" (Tyson, 1994:S-6). They calculate the equation for total estimated program
cost growth as:
TPCG= .7645 + (.3677*TSG) + (.1845*PUC) + (.2729*IMD)... where
TPCG is total program cost growth, TSG is total schedule growth, PUC is
planned unit cost in millions of 1994 dollars, and 1MD is set equal to 1 for
intercept missiles and 0 otherwise. (Tyson, 1994:S-6)
Using this equation, the researchers arrive at an adjusted R of 0.500 and an SSE of
0.259. The coefficients have significance at ap-value of 0.04 (Tyson, 1994:S-6).
For aircraft programs, the researchers derive the following predictive formula for
total program cost growth:
TPCG = .3785 * ATS.2365 * EAV8B-.3962...where TPCG is total program cost
growth, ATS is actual total schedule, and EAV8B takes the value 0 for the AV-8B
and 1 for all other aircraft. (Tyson, 1994:S-7)
The researchers find this equation has an adjusted R of 0.890 and an SSE of 0.053; the
coefficients have significance below the 0.01 level (Tyson, 1994:S-6). The researchers
conclude that, unlike the missile formula, which has an n of 20, the aircraft formula with
an n of seven lacks enough data points to have usefulness as a predictive tool (Tyson,
1994:S-6). Both of these tools attempt to predict overall cost growth rather than a
specific facet of cost growth.
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In their analysis to discover the above-mentioned formulas for predicting total
program cost growth, the IDA researchers consider several possible candidate
independent variables. These candidate variables include schedule variables, program
management variables, and program cost variables. Table 4, Table 5, and Table 6 list the
predictor variables IDA considers. These candidate variables might prove useful as
predictors for engineering cost growth.
Table 4. Candidate Independent Variables - Schedule Variables (Tyson, 1994:IV-2)

Notation

Production
MrfTajd

Definition

Development

PDS

Planned time to develop the lint verstau of the system,
measured in months from Milestone II to IOC

X

Actual development schedule

ADS

Actual time to develop the first »eision of the system,
measured in months from Milestone II to IOC

X

Development schedule growth

DSG*

Ratio of the actual devefcpneiit schechle to the planned
development schedule

X

Development schedule growth, predkted

DSGHAT

PWdtct«! rafaeofDSO to missile model fsee section
IV.B.)

Planned production schedule

PI'S

Planned time to prod«« the planned tpjantity of the
system, measured ta months from Milestone HI to
die end of production of Äe pi waed quantity

X

Actual production schedule

APS

Actual lime io produce the planned quantity of the
system, measured in months from Milestone III to
the end öf production of the plained quantity

X

Production schedule stretch

PSS

Ratio of the actual production schedule to the planned
production schedule

X

Planned total schedule

PTS

Planned time 10 develop and produce the system,
iiieasured in months from Milestone II to the end of
production of the planned quantity

X

Actual total schedule

ATS

Actual time to develop and produce the system,
measured in months from Milestone H to thee«) of
production of the planned quantity

X

Total scttedu te grow*

TSG

Ratio of the actual total schedule to the planned total

X

Schedule Variables:

* DSG is also used us ■ dependent variable in the simultaneous model for missiles.
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X {«tissues
only)

Table 5. Candidate Independent Variables - Program Variables (Tyson, 1994:IV-3)

Variable

Motation

Definite*

Development

Production
amlTotai

Pmgrvm Variables
X

Development tpantity growth

DQG

Measure of growth in Ihe developmenl quantity

Modification program

MOD

1 if Ihe program is a modiffcatiOB program, 0 otherwise

X

Competition in all-scale development

CFSD

1 if competition (dull or Multiple sources) was used in
FSD, & otherwise

X (missiles
only)

Design-io-cost

DTC

1 if design-io-eost was applied, 0 otherwise

Total package piCJcuremeitt

TPP

1 if total package procarameHl was used, 0 otherwise

IiKemiv« in full-scale development

tFSD

1 if coMraet incentives we« used in full-scale
development, 0 otherwise

X

Prototype

PRO

1 if a prototype was developed before full-scale
development, 0 otherwise

X

Competition in production

CPROD

1 if competition (dual or' nwiltipte sources) was «sed in
productim, 0 otherwise

Multiye» pocwemeBl

MYP

1 if a multiyear procurement contract was used. 0
otherwise

Fixed-price development

FPD

1 if fixed-price devetopraeal was used, 0 otherwise

X

X

Full-scale development Mart

FSDST

The year of full-scale development start, used as a proxy
for technological complexity

X

X

ConciMTeiscy

CONC

Percentage of test program remaining to be completed
at Milestone HI (see Reference [9])

X (missiles
only)

X (missiles
only)

Intercept missile dummy

IMD

1 if an talereept missile, 0 otherwise

X (missiles
only)

X (missiles
only)

1IR Maverick dummy

IIRMD

1 if an HR Maverick (AGM-65 WG}, 0 otherwise

X (missiles
only)

X (missiles
only)

AV-SB dummy

AV8BD

1 if an AV-88,0 otherwise

X (aircraft
only)

X «aircraft
only)

t AV-8E Dummy

EAV88

t (* 2,71828) if an AV-M3,1 otherwise

X (aircraft
oniy)

only)

X

X

X

X (missiles
only)

X (missiles
only)

X
X (missiles
only)
X

Table 6. Candidate Independent Variables - Total Cost Variables
(Tyson, 1994:IV-4)

Variable

-"**

JJennitKu^_

No«»«»

Total Coa Variables

PDC

Ptanoed cost to develop the system, measured it»
millions of FY 1994 dollars from Milestone H to the
end of development of the first version

Planned total cost

PTC

Planned cost »1 the total system at the Development
Estimate, measured in millions of FY 1994 dollars
from Milestone n M the end of production of platted
quantify

Harmed unit cosl

PUC

Planned cost to produce a rail M the Development
Estimate, measured in mill ions of FY 1994 dollars

X(i
only)

X(i
wily)

Woodward Study
Peter Woodward specifies an elusive factor that can affect cost growth or the
absence thereof in programs: the practice of hiding reserve funds within the budget
32

(Woodward, 1983:105). Indeed, if an estimate contains hidden reserve funds for
uncertainties, then it has extra protection against cost growth than a program that does not
have this hidden reserve. Finding such programs from SAR data proves next to
impossible, making direct analysis of this phenomenon difficult. One must remember
that program estimates may already include some reserve, whether hidden or overt, when
developing a cost estimating methodology for risk from historical data.
RAND Study (1993)
In a 1993 study, RAND determines that inflation and quantity have the greatest
effect on cost growth, but these two factors are part of the assumptions of a cost estimate
initially, so RAND excludes them from cost growth for the purposes of their study.
Although it might prove interesting to explore the historical distributions of these two
factors with respect to cost growth, we adopt RAND's approach of excluding them from
consideration.
The RAND study finds several other factors that relate to cost growth. Like the
BMDO and NAVA1R studies, RAND considers program size. DoD categorizes
acquisition programs according to how the programs compare to certain dollar thresholds.
The higher dollar programs generally receive more management scrutiny than the lower
dollar programs. More management scrutiny generally should translate into less cost
increases due to mismanagement. Thus, one would expect to find a functional
relationship between cost increases and the acquisition categories such that the programs
in the higher acquisition categories have cost increases of a lesser magnitude. The
authors of the RAND study offer another possible explanation for the difference in cost
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growth of the smaller programs, "R&D costs are a large portion of total costs and tend to
incur more cost growth" (Drezner, 1993: 49).
The maturity of the program seems to also factor largely in the cost growth of a
program. The RAND study notes that "on average, cost growth increases by 2.2 percent
per year above inflation because of the effects of maturity." RAND emphasizes the
importance of these two factors above other factors in the statement, "Program size and
maturity can dominate other factors affecting cost growth outcomes and so must be
considered in both the analysis and the interpretation of results" (Drezner, 1993: 49).
Therefore, these two factors represent prime candidates for predictor variables in a
regression search of a cost risk factor function.
The RAND study elucidates the impact of new-start programs versus modification
programs, finding that on average, the new-start programs experience more cost growth
than modification programs. This stands to reason, and one should consider this
distinction as a potential predictor variable. The RAND study also finds longer programs
to have more cost growth than shorter ones. This simple linear relationship proves quite
intuitive: each year brings the opportunity for more cost growth. "Of interest is that
planned length and various measures of schedule slip are not related systematically to
cost growth outcomes" (Drezner, 51: 1993).
Finally, RAND discovers that whether or not a program has a prototype effort has
an opposite effect on cost growth than what the researchers at RAND expect:
We compared the cost outcomes of prototyping and nonprototyping
programs, expecting to find that a prototype development strategy
contributes to cost control through reduction of uncertainty. Interestingly,
programs that included prototyping had a relatively higher cost growth.
This result may be due in part to the timing of the prototype phase within
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the context of the overall program schedule, since earlier prototyping
makes data available earlier, thus potentially affecting the baseline cost
estimate at the time of EMD start. Our results are consistent with this
notion. It may also be true that prototyping was conducted for programs
with relatively higher degrees of technical uncertainty, a hypothesis that
deserves further exploration. (Drezner, 51: 1993)
From RAND's perspective, further research might help to determine if DoD uses
prototyping on programs that are technically more risky than other programs. Basic DoD
acquisition principles dictate that technically riskier programs use prototyping to reduce
technical risk. The results of the RAND study do not necessarily defy reason: prototype
programs, in fact, have more technical risk than non-prototype programs, and the
prototyping probably does significantly reduce risk, but not necessarily to the extent so as
to make a prototyped program have less cost growth than a non-prototyped program. In a
cost growth model, we would then expect to use prototype or non-prototype as an
explanatory variable for cost growth. Alternatively, we might use prototype or nonprototype as an indicator to determine some ordinal value of technical risk, which we
might then use as a predictor variable in a cost model.
The RAND researchers conclude that "no single factor explains a large portion of
the observed variance in cost growth outcomes" (Drezner, 52: 1993). This conclusion
comes from a top-level, exploratory analysis of the total cost growth data. Whereas
RAND finds no significant explanatory variables for overall cost variance, the possibility
exists that breaking down cost growth into its components might uncover some
significant explanatory variable. In addition, using multiple regression rather than simple
linear regression might also prove useful in the search for significant explanatory
variables.

35

Christensen and Templin Study
David Christensen and Carl Templin research cost growth using the Defense
Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES) database and arrive at potentially useful
findings in the search for predictors of cost growth [The DAES database contains
contractor information organized according to the rules of Earned Value Management, a
process by which the government monitors the cost and schedule performance of
contracts against baseline figures] (Christensen, 2000:191). The researchers consider
"hundreds of DoD defense acquisition contracts from 1975 through 1998" in a hypothesis
testing scenario focused on the nature of management reserve (MR) budgets
(Christensen, 2000:191). DoD characterizes the purpose of an MR budget as "a reserve
for uncertainties related to in-scope but unforeseen work" (DoD, 1997:12). MR budgets,
because they represent the contractors' assessment of risk for acquisition programs, can
provide useful insight into the overall risk assessment that DoD uses in its budgeting
process.
Christensen and Templin recognize that many factors affect the development of a
contractor's MR budget, and that the "achievability of a budget depends on how the
budgets are established" (Christensen, 2000:195). This gives the insight that overruns
can vary depending on many factors, such as differing methods, differing abilities, and
differing motivations of those who set the MR budgets (Christensen, 2000:193). A 1998
survey of 300 DoD risk analysis professionals supports this statement by displaying the
variety of perspectives on risk analysis that exist within government and contractor
circles (See Table 7) ("U.S. Aerospace Cost Risk Analysis Survey," 2000:23). In
addition to the above, Christensen and Templin note that contractors should provide
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greater MR budgets for riskier projects. The authors go on to characterize the
development phase of acquisition as more uncertain than the production phase, and they
characterize price contracts as more uncertain than cost-reimbursement contracts
(Christensen, 2000:196). From this awareness of the diversity of the risk analysis field,
Christensen and Templin perform hypotheses testing to realize the following results:
The amount of an MR budget is sensitive to contract category (costreimbursable versus fixed-price), and the managing service. With regard
to contract category, the median MR percent on fixed-price contracts is
significantly greater than the median MR percent on cost reimbursable
contracts. This is consistent with the expectation that contracts with more
risk to the contractor have a larger MR budget. We do not know why MR
budgets differ across the three services. Possible explanatory factors
include differences in the weapon systems purchased by each service, and
the contractors that build the systems. (Christensen, 2000:204)
With regard to the acquisition phase, the researchers do not find that the MR budget
differs between production and RDT&E contracts (Christensen, 2000:202).

Table 7. Unexpected Findings ("U.S. Aerospace Cost Risk Analysis
Survey," 2000:24)
27% of analyses perform the risk assessment separately from the cost estimate.
26% of program managers do not accept risk assessment at all, not even "slightly."
32% of the risk assessments do not involve Finance or Estimating.
38% of cost risk analysts have received no training, either formal or informal.
44% of risk ranges are intuitive judgments, without historical data or guided-survey.
69% of variable distributions are triangular.
18% of unfavorable assessments are ignored, as managers "stay the course."
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Wilson Study
A 1992 study of the DAES database by Brian Wilson provides more insight into
possible predictor variables for cost growth. (Wilson, 1992:42). Wilson uses hypothesis
testing on a database of 109 contracts spanning the period from 1977 to 1991. Wilson
discovers two trends that provide insight into the current study. First, he finds at the 85
percent confidence level that "cost overruns tend to worsen as a contract progresses
toward completion" (Wilson, 1992:81). Secondly, Wilson finds that the pattern of cost
overruns over time depend upon certain program characteristics (Wilson, 1992:81).
Wilson finds the following characteristics to explain significant differences in cost
growth at the 85 percent confidence level: service, contract type, system type, and
program phase. For type of service, Wilson finds significant differences between Army
and other service programs [Wilson considers Marine Corps programs as Navy
programs]. For contract type, Wilson finds significant differences between cost plus
contracts and fixed price contracts. Wilson finds significant differences between the air
based, sea based, and land based systems. His initially chooses those system types for
testing in order to "minimize the number of system types used," and order to distinguish
between the level of "required reliability for each" (Wilson, 1992:48). He uses as an
example the fact that the consequences of failure of a land-based jeep place minimal risk
upon a user compared to the consequences of failure of an aircraft. Implicitly he seems
to assume that the level of reliability required relates to potential for cost overrun.
Finally, Wilson finds significant differences between overruns in development contracts
and those in production contracts. These results provide clear possibilities with which to
explore possible predictors of cost growth within the SAR database.
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Terry and Vanderburg Study
In another analysis using 321 defense contracts from the DAES database, Mark
Terry and Mary Vanderburg analyze contractor estimates at completion (EAC) and their
relationship to the contractor actual Cost at Completion (CAC) using hypothesis testing.
The researchers null hypothesis is that "Cost at Completion is bounded below by the Cost
Performance Index (CPl)-based EAC and above by the Schedule Performance Index
(SCl)-based EAC" (Terry, 1993:23). They resolve at the end of their analysis that they
should reject the null hypothesis (Terry, 1993:59).
Of interest to our study, the researchers test for sensitivity of their results to the
following attributes: "Index Type (cumulative, six-month and three-month), Contract
Completion Stage, Program Phase, Contract Type, Branch of Service, System Type,
Major Contract Baseline Changes, and Management Reserve" (Terry, 1993:59-60). The
sensitivity analysis performed on the Terry cost growth study, shows that the amount of
cost growth in the 321 defense contracts depended to some degree on the attributes
mentioned above, with the exception of management reserve (Terry, 1993:60). Thus in
our study, these same attributes might prove useful as independent variables.
Obringer Study
In a study by Thomas Obringer in 1988, the author studies overall cost growth in
the defense aerospace industry during the period 1980 to 1986 (Obringer, 1988:5). He
gathers data from Business Management Information Reports (BMIR) for 16 contractor
plants, which at the time comprise 32 percent of the industry's sales. In his study, he uses
hypothesis testing to discover that from 1980 to 1986 aerospace industry costs do not rise
in real terms. He also discovers a similar trend in overhead rates. The first finding
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conflicts with similar studies performed in the 1960's and 1970's on the aerospace
industry, where increasing costs emerged as the dominant trend. Obringer notes that
increased defense spending and decreased excess capacity characterize the period of his
study, alluding to a possible reason for the difference in the results from previous eras
(Obringer, 1988:84-86). The Obringer study along with the studies of the previous two
decades suggests that era might affect the results of our study. Though we will not seek
to explain the effects of era on cost growth, we limit the effects of era on our results by
limiting the timeframe of our study to a single decade (1990-2000).
An additional observation from the Obringer study, the stability of the
composition of aerospace firm costs, also provides useful insight into cost growth.
Obringer notices that his study reveals a cost composition remarkably similar to the
studies of the 1960's and 1970's (Obringer, 1988:84).

Generally speaking, all three

studies show that components of contractor costs have raw materials as the highest
percentage of total costs and overhead costs as the next highest, the two respectively
comprising about half and a third of total contractor costs (Obringer, 1988:79). Since
these two components of company cost consistently comprise over 75% of total costs, the
root causes for most cost growth likely lie within them. Of course, one must temper the
potential applicability of Obringer's findings by the narrow, aerospace-industry focus of
his study.
Singleton Study
Pamela Singleton, in her thesis, investigates the causes of cost growth in large and
small acquisition programs initiated by the then Aeronautical Systems Division from
1980 through 1988 (Singleton, 1991:7). Singleton measures cost growth as the difference
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between the most probable cost (MPC) estimate (calculated for use during source
selections) and the most current estimate of the program (for completed programs, this is
the actual program cost). Singleton performs a literature review and solicits a group of
five cost analysts to come up with a reasonable list of factors affecting cost growth in
weapon systems. The panelists rank the factors in order of effect on cost growth,
culminating in the following top three list: "technical risk, configuration stability, and
schedule risk" (Singleton, 1991:75). Singleton then collects data on 16 programs from
the Aeronautical Systems Division to test whether or not cost growth correlates to the
three factors above in this subset of programs. She finds that:
When the effect of all three factors are considered together in the
development effort, configuration stability tends to have more influence
on cost growth than the other factors. The analysis suggests that
significant cost growth should be expected if the program is operating in
an environment with low configuration stability and high schedule risk.
Though high configuration stability does not guarantee minimal cost
growth, the cost growth experienced in these programs tends to be less on
average than those with low configuration stability. (Singleton, 1991:76)
Singleton also finds that "reducing technical risk will not significantly decrease cost
growth if there is a high probability that the schedule will slip six months or more"
(Singleton, 1991:76).
In the production stage, Singleton finds similar results. When she removes the
other two factors from the scenario, Singleton finds that configuration stability greatly
influences cost growth; however, when one considers all factors together, the stability of
the system's configuration plays no significant role in driving cost growth (Singleton,
1991:76-77). Schedule risk, on the other hand, carries great weight in driving cost
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growth when including all three factors. She states that, "in all instances where the
schedule risk was high, the cost growth exceeded eighteen percent" (Singleton, 1991:76).
Although, the limited sample size hinders the ability to generalize Singleton's
results, the care that she took in determining which variables to test provides for
optimism that her results will benefit our research. The SAR database does not
systematically include information regarding the three risk factors of Singleton's study,
but some proxy for these factors may provide reasonable predictability in a cost growth
model.
As a side note to the Singleton study, DoD describes the following as "relevant
sources of risk" for cost analysts to consider:
...design concept, technology development, test requirements, schedule,
acquisition strategy, funding availability, contract stability, or any other
aspect that might cause a significant deviation from the planned program.
Any related external technology programs (planned or on-going) should
be identified, their potential contribution to the program described, and
their funding prospects and potential for success assessed. This section
should identify these risks for each acquisition phase (DEM/VAL, EMD,
production and deployment, and O&S). (Department of Defense, 1992:9)
The cost estimator must describe these sources of risk in the CARD for each program
submitted to the CAIG for review (Department of Defense, 1992:3). This description of
potential risk inciters gives clues as to potential drivers for program cost growth.
Eskew Study
In an effort to find the true rate of cost growth of fighter aircraft over time, Henry
Eskew runs a linear regression of 17 tactical aircraft from 1950 through 1980 (Eskew,
2000:210). He normalizes his data for production quantity by using the estimated 100th
production unit cost, and he normalizes his data for inflation by applying the appropriate
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DoD inflation indices to convert his data to constant year (CY) 1990. Using the
logarithm of cost as his response variable, he finds weight, speed, production rate, and
time as statistically significant predictor variables that explain "more than 90 percent of
the variation in cost" (Eskew, 2000:211-212). He also determines that, as a sole
predictor, time explains about 40 percent of the cost variation, hinting at its possible
significance as a predictor for our study (Eskew, 2000:211). In fact, all four of the
predictors he finds might prove useful areas of exploration in search of predictors for our
study.
Although useful, one must note the limitations of the Eskew study's applicability
to this study. First, Dr. Eskew looks at a limited amount of data from a limited
perspective. He only considers tactical aircraft in his search for predictors, and he only
has 17 data points. In addition, his research spans the period from 1950 through 1980,
whereas the current research spans the period from 1990 to 2000. This limits the
confidence that one can have in the applicability of his results to the research at hand.
Secondly, the perspective of cost growth in his study differs from the perspective of cost
growth for our research. Dr. Eskew's research seeks to explain cost growth as overall
increases in unit cost measured from previous programs over time. (Eskew, 2000:209).
The research of this thesis seeks to explain the growth of cost from the initial
Development Estimate as recorded in the SAR database. Thus, the results of his analysis
give insight into possible predictors of cost growth for the purposes of this study, but only
to the extent that the predictors he finds for cost growth from program to program relate
to cost growth from the Development Estimate to the actual program costs.
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In the same research paper, Dr. Eskew seeks to dispel the myth that "no
systematic relationship exists between the characteristics of an aircraft program and the
length of its development cycle" (Eskew, 2000:210). He uses the same normalization
techniques mentioned earlier for inflation and quantity; however, he includes different
aircraft, adding non-tactical fixed wing aircraft, and removing non-fixed wing aircraft
(Eskew, 2000:214). The results of his 18 data-point regression show that unit flyaway
cost predicts approximately 60 percent of the variance in the length of the development
program: this predictive ability increases to 70 percent when a dummy variable is added
indicating whether or not a program has inherited a significant amount of technology
from a previous program (Eskew, 2000:214-215).
Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we document many studies that query different databases using
various statistical methods in the quest to explain cost growth in DoD acquisition. From
these studies, we derive the following general list of predictor variables that we will
pursue in our research: program size, physical type of program, management
characteristics (military and contractor), schedule characteristics (maturity and
concurrency measures), and other characteristics mentioned in the literature review.
None of the historical studies deals directly with cost growth in the RDT&E budget from
engineering changes in EMD. Yet, from the results of these studies, we might gain the
insight required to successfully find predictors of engineering cost growth in the current
study.
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III. Methodology
Chapter Overview
This chapter describes the process by which we conduct this research. We begin
by reviewing our literature results, which provide clues that help us select possible
predictors of cost growth. The literature results also form a backdrop of knowledge in
which we critique the results of this research. We next assess the data source and
describe the process by which we collect and compile the data. Finally, we describe the
exploratory data analysis and regression techniques that we use.
Literature Synopsis
The 1993 RAND study based on SAR data serves as the cornerstone of the
literature review. The RAND corporation accomplishes a descriptive statistical analysis
on overall cost growth (normalized for inflation and quantity changes) in both
procurement and RDT&E dollars, from which we form general impressions about cost
growth as it relates to different programmatic characteristics. We go on to analyze
several studies pertaining to the broad areas of cost growth and risk analysis. We fail to
find a study that shares the narrow focus of our study - RDT&E cost growth in the EMD
phase due to engineering changes. Thus, our study differs from all other studies in one
very important way: our study allows for the possibility that a group of candidate
predictors may vary in either their ability to predict or the degree to which they predict
the seven different SAR categories of cost growth. This difference limits the
applicability of our literature review somewhat, but by no means renders null its
emolument: the review still provides useful clues toward our purpose. We limit
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ourselves to predictors that we can find within the SAR data. Consequently, some of the
clues we find in our literature review remain fertile ground left for future researchers to
explore.
Search for Predictors of Cost Growth
From the past research, we identify possible predictor variables for the current
study in cost growth. Ideally, we detect logical causality between predictor and response
variables; however, apparent causal relationships need not exist for inclusion as a
candidate variable. We need only suspect a reasonable prediction possibility for
consideration as a candidate predictor.
As an example of predictability without apparent causality, consider the
independent variable whether a program had a PDRR phase. This independent variable
would seem to have no causal relationship with whether a program in the EMD phase
will have cost growth. Contrarily, we suspect the level of program uncertainty at the
start ofEMD does have a causal relationship with whether a program in the EMD phase
will have cost growth. However, we have no way of determining from our data the level
of program uncertainty at the start of EMD. We recognize that whether a program had a
PDRR phase logically correlates to the uncertainty level. Thus, we use whether a
program had a PDRR phase as a proxy for the level of program uncertainty at the start of
EMD.
In our search for predictors, we keep in mind that the estimator must either know
or be able to estimate the predictors chosen at the time the program office accomplishes
the DE. In other words, a candidate variable might accurately predict cost growth, but if
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the cost estimator has no idea of the value ofthat candidate variable at the time he
produces the estimate, he cannot use it to produce a cost estimate of the response
variable. Thus, a model that we produce must not include such recondite variables.
Finally, an estimator must easily understand the relationship between the
predictor variables and the response variables in any models we discover. If the
estimator does not understand the variables, two problems arise. First, the estimator
might lack faith in the model, causing him to discredit its results. Second, even if the
estimator supports the model, he will not have the ability to support it in the event if falls
under management scrutiny. Thus, the predictors we find do not have to demonstrate an
apparent causal relationship with the response variables, but they must have some logical
tie to the response variables that the estimator can easily understand, and they must be
available at the time of the estimate.
Database
We use cost variances and other information as recorded in the Selected
Acquisition Report (SAR) database for this analysis. The SAR data records cost
variances in base year as well as then year dollars. We use the base year dollars for
analysis, since these dollars exclude estimated inflationary effects. This format facilitates
conversion of the various base years of individual estimates into a single base year,
making possible easy comparison across programs. The SAR records cost variances in
seven different categories:
•

Economic: changes in price levels due to the state of the national
economy

•

Quantity: changes in the number of units procured
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•

Estimating: changes due to refinement of estimates

•

Engineering: changes due to physical alteration

•

Schedule: changes due to program slip/acceleration

•

Support: changes associated with support equipment

•

Other: changes due to unforeseen events (Drezner, 1993:7)

In addition to these categories, the SAR also provides the total cost variance - the
sum of the above seven variances. The RAND study of 1993 analyzes the total cost
variance, whereas this thesis focuses on cost variance due to engineering changes
specifically. The RAND researchers only study positive cost variances (i.e., cost
growth). Similarly, the study at hand focuses on cost growth, but does consider zero and
negative cost variances to a degree, thus we collect all cost variance data, whether zero,
positive, or negative.
The SAR database contains a variety of programmatic information from major
defense acquisition programs from all military services. This information includes
historical, schedule, cost, budget, and performance information for the life cycle of the
program. Only programs that meet the dollar thresholds or that have the Congressional
interest making them ACAT 1C or D programs have files in the SAR database (Knoche,
2001:1). The ACAT criteria change over time, but the programs listed in the SAR files
consistently represent programs with high-level government interest. In some cases, the
information we desire from the SAR database has a security classification. For security
reasons, we do not use this information in the compilation of our database. Thus, the
subset of the SAR database we use represents a compilation of the programmatic details
of some (but not all) of the most important DoD programs.
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Our research is not the first using the SAR; in the early 1990's, RAND researches
the SAR and produces a modified SAR database. This database contains selected
information from individual SARs in spreadsheet format. Unfortunately, the RAND
spreadsheets do not break cost growth into its seven parts as mentioned above. In
addition, the latest entries in the RAND database date back to the early 1990s. Finally,
the RAND database lacks adequate information on many of the predictor values that we
wish to investigate. All of these shortcomings make the RAND database useful only as a
verification tool for part of the data collection effort.
The SAR Database as a Source of Historical Data
According to RAND, researchers of cost growth commonly use the SAR database
to conduct their research (Hough, 1992:v). RAND notes that while the government has
continually improved the quality and consistency of information included in the SAR
database, the database still has numerous "pitfalls" that a cost analyst must attenuate in
order to maximize the validity of analyses based on the SAR (Hough, 1992:v). Those
problems most prevalent follow:
•

Failure of some programs to use a consistent baseline cost estimate

•

Exclusion of some significant elements of cost

•

Exclusion of certain classes of major programs (e.g., special access
programs)

•

Constantly changing preparation guidelines

•

Inconsistent interpretation of preparation guidelines across programs

•

Unknown and variable funding levels for program risk

•

Cost sharing in j oint programs
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•

Reporting of effects of cost changes rather than their root causes (Hough,
1992:v)

The SAR provides some consistency in the reporting of programmatic data, but as
RAND describes, "...although the basic content of the SAR sections is established by
DoD Instruction 7000.3, interprogram comparisons can be complicated by the fact that
specific details vary" (Hough, 1992:4). In addition to differences in specific details, the
guidelines themselves change over time, providing a further source of inconsistency
(Hough, 1992:4). Despite possible difficulties with the data, RAND recognizes the SAR
as "the logical source of data for calculating cost growth on major procurements"
(Hough, 1992:9).
For cost estimating purposes, the cost analyst should normalize the cost growth
for inflation and quantity changes, because these can have a large effect on the cost
growth, and reliable methods exist with which to make these adjustments (Hough,
1992:10). The SAR format devotes two of the seven cost variance categories to capture
these adjustments. Thus, we have no such adjustments to make on the data we collect
from the SAR engineering cost growth category.
According to RAND, the cost analyst must decide from which baseline to
measure cost growth. The SAR offers three different baselines, the planning estimate
(PE), the development estimate (DE), and the production estimate (PdE). These
estimates occur before the start of Milestone 1, II, and III, respectively. The RAND study
mentions that cost estimates performed later in the product's life cycle more accurately
reflect the program cost. This observation by RAND holds true, because program
uncertainty drives the accuracy of cost estimates, and as programs progress uncertainties
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become certainties. It follows that cost growth increases as measured from the PE versus
the DE, and it increases as measured from the DE versus the PdE (Hough, 1992:10-11).
Figure 3 presents the relationships between the different baseline estimates and the
acquisition phases, adding the additional categorization of funding appropriation. Thus,
one can consider several different measures of cost growth: growth of procurement
dollars from the PE; growth of procurement dollars from the DE; growth of
procurement dollars from the PdE; growth of RDT&E dollars from the PE; and, the cost
growth our study researches, growth of RDT&E dollars from the DE.
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Figure 3. Introduction to SARs-SAR Types (Dameron, 2001:4)
RAND defines cost growth as "the difference between the most recent or final
estimate of the total acquisition cost for a program and the initial estimate" (Hough,
1992:10). This definition applies to program cost growth as measured from the first
estimate made (PE, DE, or PdE depending on the program structure) through the end of
the program. Since our research investigates cost growth only in the EMD phase, we
consider as our initial estimate the DE. This echoes the method used in the NAVAIR
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study mentioned in Chapter II of this thesis, whereby they calculate different cost growth
factors for each acquisition phase. The PE, DE, and PdE respectively serve as
denominators of those cost growth factors. Our study ultimately seeks to predict cost
growth in the form of a factor to apply to a cost estimate. As such, we combine the
RAND and NAVAIR philosophies. For our calculations, we compute percent
engineering cost growth by first calculating the difference of the current estimate minus
the DE. Then we divide the result by the DE. The SAR data contains all the necessary
information to make these calculations.
The Baseline Problem
RAND notes that even though an analyst selects a certain baseline from which to
measure cost growth, that baseline might not represent a consistent measure across
different programs for two reasons. First, rebaselining might occur (the program office
accomplishes a new baseline in the middle of an acquisition phase). This new program
estimate retains the name PE, DE, or PdE (as appropriate), making it indistinguishable
from a program that does not have an estimate rebaseline. If an analyst does not choose
the correct DE from which to measure the program cost growth, the rebaselining will
understate cost growth. RAND mentions that this happens infrequently. Evolutionary
model changes provide a second reason for inconsistency in the baseline. Evolutionary
model changes occur when a program's "configuration has been modified so much that
current models only remotely resemble what was originally estimated." These changes
prove difficult to normalize out of the SAR data (Hough, 1992:12-14).
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Exclusion of Certain Program Costs
The RAND researchers identify the fact that the SAR excludes certain program
costs. The SAR does not require all categories of costs relevant to an acquisition
program. Operating and Support Costs at the time of this RAND study has no place in
the SAR. This practice has since changed, but enough time has not elapsed so that such a
change permeates the entirety of any extensive cost database built from the SAR data. A
second exclusion from the SAR, technical deficiency, prevents the precise measurement
of a deviation from the baseline cost estimate. In order to have a precise measure of this
deviation, any technical tradeoffs made would need quantification and inclusion in the
SAR. Third, contractor-borne expenses do not appear in the SAR. These expenses occur
when a contractor invests his own money in a project or when certain fixed-price
contracts with contractors prevent the disclosure of cost increases within contract limits.
As a fourth example of excluded costs, RAND mentions that in some cases, spare parts,
simulators, and other types of costs that have a clear link to the program do not receive
recognition in the SAR (Hough, 1992:12-47).
Additionally, RAND speaks of the practice of postponing the reporting of cost
growth as "closely related to the problem of unrecognized costs." Program managers will
postpone cost reporting until after a significant milestone decision, which results in cost
growth reporting in the incorrect program phase. As a final note, the RAND researchers
relate that the ties a program estimate must maintain to the annual budget can cause a
delay in the reporting of certain cost growth information if the president's budget does
not receive Congressional approval in time for inclusion in the annual, December SAR.
For most, if not all, of these excluded costs, RAND advises that reasonable means do not
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exist by which to normalize the SAR data; the estimator should however, be aware of the
possible effects of their exclusion on the accuracy of the data (Hough, 1992:12-17).
Incomplete and Evolving Database
Commonly, an estimator performs analysis based on a small portion of the SAR
database. RAND notes that the estimator must take care to ensure that the sample pulled
from the SAR represents the population that the analysis seeks to characterize. RAND
states, "...quality studies on cost growth should identify what portion of the total SAR
population is included and why the sample is representative of the whole or is satisfactory
for meeting the study objectives." Additionally, the SAR database excludes a large
portion of defense programs - those programs of high security classification. This
exclusion makes the entire SAR database incomplete to start with, and worse, these
excluded, high-security programs represent the bulk of the programs pushing the
envelope of modern technology (Hough, 1992:16-18).
Inconsistency in SAR Preparation Guidelines and Techniques
In order to improve the quality of the SARs, Congress continuously changes the
preparation guidelines. Although these changes often have no impact on cost data,
occasionally they do have a significant impact. These impacting changes may improve
the quality or content of the data, but negatively affect the uniformity of the database
such that comparisons over time must receive scrutiny. Further aggravating this point,
not all organizations adopt the changes at the same time; RAND observes that, "after a
major change, consistency among SARs is not ensured until all programs with current
reporting begin under the same set of rules" (Hough, 1992:19-20).
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RAND further notes that pressures to bias the SAR data exist on certain levels
such that preparers might attempt to skew the data in some manner. This detracts from
the accuracy of the data, possibly confounding any sort of analysis attempted on the
database. As a program matures, the amount of unknowns in a program decreases, which
in turn decreases the places in a program budget where room exists for stretching the
reasonableness of assumptions in such a way as to bias the estimate (Hough, 1992:2021).
Unknown and Variable Funding Levels for Program Risk
Cost estimators include monetary padding for risk within their estimates.
Because of the instability of the acquisition-funding environment, Congress and the
services often take money from one program to fund another. To avoid becoming a
victim of this budgetary cannibalization, programs will often covertly include their
management reserve funding within another budget line item. Thus, the SAR includes
estimates for risk, the methodologies for which vary from service to service and from
estimator to estimator. Quantification of these risk estimates proves impossible, making
normalization of the database, in this regard, impossible as well (Hough, 1992:21).
Cost Sharing in Joint Programs
In joint programs, estimators can apply costs for investment to one program or
spread the costs across all participants in some way. No guidelines exist for a single
method in handling such situations. The lack of guidance causes inconsistency in the
reporting of large portions of cost in joint programs, creating innate inaccuracies in cost
growth analysis across joint programs (Hough, 1992:22).
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Reporting Effects of Cost Changes Rather Than Root Causes
Although the SAR has a section for change explanations when cost growth
occurs, the S ARs do not systematically disclose the "root causes" of cost growth. An
analyst might forage through other sections of the SAR to look for clues that point to the
"root causes," but the results of such searches may prove questionable. This weakness
hinders the ability of the SAR to provide analysts with drivers of cost growth (Hough,
1992:23).
The RAND Corporation thoroughly assesses the limitations within the SAR
database. These limitations do not prevent us from discovering a cost model that
provides benefit to the end user. In fact, as databases go, a database built from SARs has
advantages to it that other databases do not. First, it conforms to a strict reporting format,
providing consistency to the data. Second, those who create SAR reports receive annual
SAR training, which adds to the consistency of the data (Knoche, 2001:2.B.3.2). Third,
because SARs go before Congress, the level of scrutiny that SARs receive in the review
process bolsters both the consistency and accuracy of the documents. Databases in
general contain inaccuracies, but a database built from SAR data arguably withstands
scrutiny better than most.
Data Collection
Security classification poses an obstacle to data collection. The SAR database
contains some sensitive information. Indeed, some information that might prove useful
to this research effort is sensitive on certain programs. We exclude data that has a
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security classification; thus, the research database has incomplete information for some
programs and excludes other programs altogether (when the entire file is classified).
The SAR database contains thousands of individual files representing a variety of
programs from each service over a variety of years, and each SAR report contains a great
deal of information that can potentially prove useful for this research effort. In this
situation, we narrow the scope of the data we collect. Because of the broad nature of
some of the goals in the research effort, such as seeking the effects of joint program
management in cost variance, the data collection effort does not exclude the collection of
files based on branch of military service or program type. Instead, the data collection
starts with the most recent SAR data available and works backwards, collecting an initial,
broad collection of data points to arrive at preliminary research results.
Additionally, we desire the most current information to capture recent trends.
Thus, we start our collection effort with the latest SARs available and work backwards in
time until we have a sufficient number of data points to support a statistically significant
regression. Specifically, the latest SARs at our disposal date within the summer of 2000.
Thus, we start with those SARs and work backwards through the entire 1990 collection.
As discussed earlier, we exclude those SAR files that have preventive security
classifications. We also only include one SAR for each program - the latest. This
ensures we have independence of data points. Further, since this research effort only
concerns cost growth in the EMD phase, we include only SARs for which the DE serves
as the baseline estimate. Once we determine which files to collect, we decide what
information within the file might prove useful for predicting engineering cost increases.
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Not only do we have to determine which information from the SAR files to
extract, but also in what form the data will prove useful. In some cases, we perform
mathematical operations between data in the SAR files to arrive at a possible predictor.
The predictors RAND uses in their 1993 study provide guidance as to the form of some
of the predictors we use. In other cases, we find similarities between SAR files and
categorize those files accordingly. In a few cases, we seek outside sources to fill in gaps
of information that the SAR leaves out. In these ways, we not only narrow down the
information within the SARs, but also create additional information leveraging from data
within the SARs.
Exploratory Data Analysis
Before data analysis, we expect to find a continuous distribution of data upon
which we can perform multiple regression analysis in order to find a sufficient predictive
formula. However, after collecting and analyzing the data, we find the response variable
to have a mixed distribution. About half of the distribution is continuous, while the other
half is massed on one value, zero. This mixed distribution scenario generally calls for
splitting the data into two sets.
This splitting of the data logically follows from the incongruity between the two
distributions. In a continuous distribution, the probability of obtaining a specific value is
approximately zero. Such a probability does not accurately reflect the fact that many of
the points in our data fell directly on zero. For the discrete distribution, we use logistic
regression, and we use multiple regression analysis for the continuous distribution. Thus,
we develop a logistic regression model to predict whether or not a program will have cost
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growth from a full data set, and we develop a multiple regression model from only those
programs that had cost growth to predict the amount of cost growth we expect. For
comparison purposes, we decide to pursue a single-step multiple regression model as
well. This serves to ascertain what would occur if one overlooked the mixed distribution
and attempted an estimation of the mean cost growth.
In addition to the mixed distribution, we find that a few of the programs have
negative engineering cost variance. A user would not realistically assign negative values
to cost growth in an estimate; however, we consider the negative values in the creation
of the single-step multiple regression model. For the logistic regression portion of our
analysis, we convert all negative cost growth to zero cost growth.
Before we start the regression analysis, we set apart approximately 20 percent of
our data for validation purposes and sensitivity analysis. We use the random number
generator in Microsoft® EXCEL (Microsoft, 2000) that uses a uniform distribution to
choose which data we set aside. Before performing regression, we must also choose the
response and candidate predictor variables.
Response Variables
As mentioned in Chapter 1, this research seeks to find predictors of cost increase
due to engineering changes. The SAR includes two main categories of engineering cost
growth - increase in the research and development budget and increase in the
procurement budget. Additionally, adding the two gives the total engineering change
increase. Consequently, three possible response variables arise from the SAR data. We
find it necessary to consider RDT&E and procurement separately, because certain
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predictor variables might work contrary to RDT&E cost growth versus procurement cost
growth; therefore, we discard as a possible response variable the total cost increase due
to engineering changes. Further, in the interest of time, we choose to study only the
RDT&E increases.
We concern ourselves with two different response variables, one that indicates if
cost growth will occur and another that expresses the degree to which cost growth occurs.
The first of the two, we express as a binary variable where the value ' 1' means that we
estimate a program will have engineering cost growth in RDT&E dollars, while the value
'0' means that it will not. We call this variable R&D Cost Growth?.
In order to make the model as useful as possible, we decide that the second
response variable should have the form of a percentage, rather than a dollar amount. The
percent format applies well to programs with both large and small acquisition costs,
whereas the dollar amount format might require us to force a program size variable into
the model for the results to intuitively make sense. For example, a model with length of
EMD and maturity from milestone III decision might produce a predicted engineering
cost growth of 50 million dollars for both a 100 million dollar program and a 5 billion
dollar program. Although this might be a valid result statistically, it might prove difficult
for program managers to put into context. Thus, we strive to find a model to predict
percent change in RDT&E cost due to engineering changes. As discussed earlier in the
chapter, we use the DE as the denominator of the percentage. We call this second
response variable Engineering %.
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Predictor Variables
Several possible predictor variables exist within the SAR data. We aim to create
a tool for cost estimators to create more realistic estimates, so the inputs for such a tool
must be available to the estimator at the time of the estimate. However, we do not
exclude variables from our analysis that do not meet this availability criterion. Rather,
we analyze those variables to discover if predictive ability exists in the hopes of finding
some correlated variable that the estimator might have available at the time of estimate
creation.
The predictor variables we extracted from the SAR fall into five broad categories:
program size, physical type of program, management characteristics, schedule
characteristics, and other characteristics. Within these broad categories, we create two
levels of subcategories. We list the predictor variables below by category and
subcategories along with a short description of the subcategories that includes
explanation of ambiguous elements where necessary:
Program Size Variables
•
•

•
•
•

Total Cost CY $M2001 - continuous variable which indicates the total cost of the
program in CY$M 2001
Total Quantity - continuous variable which indicates the total quantity of the
program at the time of the SAR date; if no quantity is specified, we assume a
quantity of one (or another appropriate number) unless the program was
terminated
Prog Acq Unit Cost - continuous variable that equals the quotient of the total cost
and total quantity variables above
Qty during PE - continuous variable that indicates the quantity that was estimated
in the Planning Estimate
Qty planned for R&D$ - continuous variable which indicates the quantity in the
baseline estimate
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Physical Type of Program
Domain of Operation Variables
o Air - binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; includes programs that
primarily operate in the air; includes air-launched tactical missiles and
strategic ground-launched or ship-launched missiles
o Land- binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; includes tactical groundlaunched missiles; does not include strategic ground-launched missiles
o Space - binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; includes satellite
programs and launch vehicle programs
o Sea - binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; includes ships and shipborne systems other than aircraft and strategic missiles
Function Variables
o Electronic - binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; includes all computer
programs, communication programs, electronic warfare programs that do
not fit into the other categories
o Helo - binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; helicopters; includes V-22
Osprey
o Missile - binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; includes all missiles
o Aircraft - binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; does not include
helicopters
o Munition - binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no
o Land Vehicle - binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no
o Ship - binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; includes all watercraft
o Other - binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; any program that does not
fit into one of the other function variables
Management Characteristics
Military Service Management
o Svs > 1 - binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; number of services
involved at the date of the SAR
o Svs > 2 - binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; number of services
involved at the date of the SAR
o Svs > 3 - binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; number of services
involved at the date of the SAR
o Service = Navy Only - binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no
o Service = Joint - binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no
o Service = Army Only - binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no
o Service = AF Only - binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no
o Lead Svc = Army - binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no
o Lead Svc = Navy - binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no
o Lead Svc = DoD - binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no
o Lead Svc = AF- binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no
o AF Involvement - binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no
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o N Involvement - binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no
o MC Involvement - binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no
o AR Involvement - binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no
Contractor Characteristics
o Lockheed-Martin - binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no
o Northrup Grumman - binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no
o Boeing - binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no
o Raytheon - binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no
o Litton - binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no
o General Dynamics - binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no
o No Major Defense KTR - binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; a
program that does not use one of the contractors mentioned immediately
above =1
o More than 1 Major Defense KTR - binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no;
a program that includes more than one of the contractors listed above = 1
o Fixed-Price EMD Contract - binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no
Schedule Characteristics
RDT&E and Procurement Maturity Measures
o Maturity (Funding Yrs complete) - continuous variable which indicates
the total number of years completed for which the program had RDT&E
or procurement funding budgeted
o Funding YR Total Program Length - continuous variable which indicates
the total number of years for which the program has either RDT&E
funding or procurement funding budgeted
o Funding Yrs ofR&D Completed- continuous variable which indicates the
number of years completed for which the program had RDT&E funding
budgeted
o Funding Yrs ofProd Completed- continuous variable which indicates the
number of years completed for which the program had procurement
funding budgeted
o Length of Prod in Funding Yrs - continuous variable which indicates the
number of years for which the program has procurement funding budgeted
o Length of R&D in Funding Yrs - continuous variable which indicates the
number of years for which the program has RDT&E funding budgeted
o R&D Funding Yr Maturity % - continuous variable which equals Funding
Yrs ofR&D Completed divided by Length ofR&D in Funding Yrs
o Proc Funding Yr Maturity % - continuous variable which equals Funding
Yrs ofR&D Completed divided by Length ofProd in Funding Yrs
o Total Funding Yr Maturity % - continuous variable which equals Maturity
(Funding Yrs complete) divided by Funding YR Total Program Length
EMD Maturity Measures
o Maturity from MS II in mos - continuous variable calculated by
subtracting the earliest MS II date indicated from the date of the SAR
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o Actual Length ofEMD (MS III-MSII in mos) - continuous variable
calculated by subtracting the earliest MS II date from the latest MS III
date indicated
o MS* Ill-based Maturity ofEMD % - continuous variable calculated by
dividing Maturity from MS II in mos by Actual Length ofEMD (MS IIIMS II in mos)
o Actual Length ofEMD using IOC-MS II in mos - continuous variable
calculated by subtracting the earliest MS II date from the IOC date
o IOC-based Maturity ofEMD % - continuous variable calculated by
dividing Maturity from MS II in mos by Actual Length ofEMD using IOCMS II in mos
o Actual Length ofEMD using FUE-MSII in mos - continuous variable
calculated by subtracting the earliest MS II date from the FUE date
o FUE-based Maturity ofEMD % - continuous variable calculated by
dividing Maturity from MS II in mos by Actual Length ofEMD using
FUE-MS II in mos
Concurrency Indicators
o MS* III Complete - binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no
o Proc Started based on Funding Yrs - binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for
no; if procurement funding is budgeted in the year of the SAR or before,
then = 1
o Proc Funding before MS ///-binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no
o Concurrency Measure Interval - continuous variable which measures the
amount of testing still occurring during the production phase in months;
actual IOT&E completion minus MS MA (Jarvaise, 1996:26)
o Concurrency Measure % - continuous variable which measures the
percent of testing still occurring during the production phase; (MS MA
minus actual IOT&E completion) divided by (actual minus planned
IOT&E dates) (Jarvaise, 1996:26)
Other Characteristics
# Product Variants in this SAR - continuous variable which indicates the number
of versions included in the EMD effort that the current SAR addresses
Class -S- binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; security classification Secret
Class -C- binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; security classification
Confidential
Class - U- binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; security classification
Unclassified
Class at Least S - binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; security classification is
Secret or higher
Risk Mitigation - binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; indicates whether there
was a version previous to SAR or significant pre-EMD activities
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Versions Previous to SAR - binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; indicates
whether there was a significant, relevant effort prior to the DE; a pre-EMD
prototype or a previous version of the system would apply
Modification - binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; indicates whether the
program is a modification of a previous program
Prototype - binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; indicates whether the
program had a prototyping effort
Dem/Val Prototype - binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; indicates whether
the prototyping effort occurred in the PDRR phase
EMD Prototype - binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; indicates whether the
prototyping effort occurred in the EMD phase
Did it have a PE - binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; indicates whether the
program had a Planning Estimate
Significant pre-EMD activity immediately prior to current version - binary
variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; indicates whether the program had activities in
the schedule at least six months prior to MSII decision
Did it have a MS I - binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no
Terminated- binary variable: 1 for yes and 0 for no; indicates if the program was
terminated
The contractor variables in particular require elucidation. The SAR data contains
45 different contractors for the programs in our database. Such a large number of
contractors leads to a small number of repeat contractors on different programs, even
considering that more than one contractor often work on the same program. These small
numbers create problems with coming up with statistically relevant results. Fortunately
for our research, the 1990s represented a time of intense defense contractor consolidation.
Table 8 shows selected defense contractor consolidations that occur from the period
1993-2000 (Druyun, 2001:4). From these consolidations, we re-categorize our
contractors as depicted in Table 9. This gives us sufficient data points for most of the
categories to achieve useable results from the regressions.
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Table 8. Defense Contractor Consolidations from 1993-2000 (Druyun, 2001:4)

Rockwell Defense & Aerospace
Boeing
McDonnell Douglas
Hughes Satellite Systems
General Dynamics Space
GE Aerospace
Martin Marietta
General Dynamics Ft Worth
Lockheed
Loral
IBM Federal Systems
Unisys Defense
LM Sanders
LM Control Systems
Tracor
Convair
General Dynamics Electronics
Viro
Marconi Electronic Systems
Chrysler Defense
E-Systems
Raytheon
Hughes Aircrat
Texas Instruments Electronics
Computing Devices International
Advanced Technology Systems
Lockheed Martin Armament
Bath Iron Works
General Dynamics
NASSCO Holdings
K-C Aviation
GTE Government Systems
Gulfstream Aerospace
Northrop
Grumman
Vought Aircrat
Westinghouse Defense
Logicon
Ryan Aeronautical
TASC
Sperry Marine
PRC
Litton Industries
Avondale

Boeing
X
X
X
X

Lockheed
Martin

BAE Systems
North America

Raytheon

General
Dynamics

Northrup
Grumman

Litton

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Regarding the EMD maturity variables, we address both ambiguity and scarcity
within the schedule parameters that make up the maturity variables. MS II and MS III
dates often have different versions of the same schedule item, making unclear which date
to use for computation. For example, a program might have a MS IIA and a MS IIB.
The same situation exists for the MS III dates. In order to capture the entire EMD effort,
we use the earliest MS II date and the latest MS III date available for our maturity
calculations. In our EMD maturity variables that use IOC or FUE for computation, we
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face a scarcity of data points. In the case of IOC-based maturity computations, 19 of our
90 data points do not have values, which shrinks the database considerably. For FUEbased maturity computations, the database shrinks to only 28 useable data points. The
effects of the scarcity of data points somewhat limits the potential use of these as
predictors in our regression models.
Table 9. Original Contractors vs. Consolidated Contractors
New List of Contractor Variables

Orisinal List of Contractor Variables
Magnavox

Pratt & Whitney

Lockheed-Martin

McDonnell Douglas

At&T

Northrop Grumman

Bell-Textron

Stewart Stevenson

Boeing

Hughes

Texas Instruments

Raytheon

IBM

Plessey

Litton

GE

E-Systems

General Dynamics

LTV

Motorolla

No Major Defense Contractor

Lockheed-Martin

Avondale

More than 1 Major Defense Contractor

ITT

Bendix

Westinghouse

Ford Aerospace

Northrop Grumman

M1DSCO

Control Data

Honeywell

Rockwell

Coleman Research

Boeing

Standard Missile

United Defense

Loral Voight

FMC

Osh Kosh

Sikorsky

Aerojet

Raytheon

Newport News

Litton

Teledyne

EG&G Defense

AIA

Bechtel

United Technologies

TRW

GTE

General Dynamics

The concurrency indicators allude to the degree to which the production and EMD
phases overlap. Concurrency Measure Interval and Concurrency Measure % we
calculate using formulas from RAND's Defense System Cost Performance Database
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(Jarvaise, 1996:26). These two variables suffer from the same problem as the FUE and
IOC-based maturity computations - using them restricts the number of data points that
we can use in our regressions.
Logistic Regression
Logistic regression provides a tool for analyzing possible predictive relationships
when the response is either nominal or ordinal. Logistic regression mainly predicts
binary outcomes, usually coded '0' and '1' (Neter, 1996:567). In our logistic regression,
we seek to develop a model that will predict whether a program will have engineering
cost growth or not. Thus, in our historical database, we code a program T if it has cost
growth and '0' if it has either no cost growth or negative cost growth. We do not concern
ourselves with negative cost growth for a pragmatic reason: an estimator would not
assess negative cost growth in an estimate. Because we have a distribution of l's and 0's,
we characterize whether or not a program has engineering cost growth as a Bernoulli
random variable with probability/? of success (success=l) (Neter, 1996:568).
Logistic regression takes our historical database of l's and 0's and estimates the
parameters of the model that best fits the predictor values entered into it. Logistic
regression is based on the logistic response function and uses the method of maximum
likelihood to estimate the parameters that create the best model for the mix of dependent
and independent variables (Neter, 1996; Whitehead, 2001). One form of the simple
logistic response function is: Ln[p/(l-p)] = a + BX+ e (Whitehead, 2001:2). This form
of the function shows that it essentially represents a linear function with a Y
transformation (Whitehead, 2001:2). Applying the natural exponent to both sides of the
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equation, we isolate [p/(l-p)] and acquire the following equation: [p/(l-p)] = expa exp
expxexpe. The left side of the equation is called the odds ratio. This ratio represents the
probability of success (1) divided by the probability of failure (0).
Dr. Whitehead of East Carolina University discusses the usefulness of the odds
ratio and the interpretation of the coefficient B in "An Introduction to Logistic
Regression." He mentions that one cannot interpret the coefficient of the independent
variable X in the logistic function the same way that one would for a linear regression.
One can gain an understanding of the effect of the coefficient in logistic regression by
considering the effect on the odds ratio in the one-variable model (this interpretation does
not apply to multiple-variable models). As X increases by one unit, the odds ratio
increases exps. In our situation, where T = cost growth and '0' = no cost growth, if
exps=3, then as X increases by one unit, our chance of experiencing cost growth increases
three-fold (Whitehead, 2001:2-3).
Neter et al. add to the description of the logistic response function coefficients by
describing the graph of the function. "A logistic response function is either monotonic
increasing or monotonic decreasing, depending on the sign of B\. Further, it is almost
linear in the range where E{7} is between .2 and .8 and gradually approaches 0 and 1 at
the two ends of the X range" (Neter, 1996:571). The version of the formula Neter et al.
use to plot the function follows: E{7) = exp^o^i^0 / (1+ exp(so+siX)). In the terms Dr.
Whitehead uses, the equation is: p = [exp(aW)] / [1+ exp(a+BX)] (Whitehead, 2001:2).
Figure 4 shows the reason for the use of the logistic regression: the function constrains
itself to values between zero and one. This particular figure shows the value of E{7} (or
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p) when B is positive. As X increases, p increases. When B is negative, as X increases, p
decreases (Neter, 1996:571).

¥«1

Y=©

Figure 4. Logistic Regression Function (Whitehead, 2001:3)
We use JMPi® 4 (SAS Institute, 2001) software to accomplish the logistic
regression in order to help us identify the best model for estimating whether or not a
program will have cost growth. JMP® uses maximum likelihood to estimate the
coefficients of our model. Because JMP® has no automatic method, such as stepwise, for
logistic regression, we manually compute thousands of individual regressions, recording
our results on spreadsheets. We start with one-predictor models of all possible variables.
Then we regress using all combinations of two-predictor models and record the results.
We continue this process, eventually whittling down the best combinations for use at the
next level in order to cut down on the amount of regressions necessary. We stop when
we reach a model for which the gain of adding another variable does not warrant the
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additional complexity of the model that another variable adds. We intend to find several
candidate models for each number of predictors and then narrow down to the best one for
each number of predictors and validate the model using about 20 percent of the data that
we set aside for validation.
Multiple Regression
In order to discover prediction models for the percent of engineering cost growth
based on more than one predictor variable, we use multiple regression. As with logistic
regression, we use JMP® for the multiple regression analysis. We use the stepwise
method to identify those predictor variables that have a statistically significant impact on
the ability of the model to predict our response variable, Engineering %. From our
stepwise analysis, we build models using the standard least squares method, whereby
JMP® estimates the form of the functional relationship between the predictors and the
response variable that minimize the sum of squared deviations from the predicted values
at each level of the predictors (Neter, 1996).
Because of the large amount of candidate predictor variables, we exceed JMP®'s
stepwise calculation abilities when we include all of our variables in a single run. In
addition, we seek models with varying numbers of predictors. Thus, we must repeat the
stepwise and standard least squares several times in order to achieve the desired results.
As with logistic regression, we discover several candidate models for each number of
predictors. Then we narrow our results to the best model for each number of predictors.
We continue adding variables to the model until the number of variables equals about one
tenth of the number of data points used in the model; this ensures we do not over-fit the
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model (Neter, 1996:437). We check the model's robustness using the same validation
data as for the logistic regression.
We build four regression models that we briefly introduce in this paragraph. We
build one logistic model using 90 data points. This model predicts whether a program
will have engineering cost growth in RDT&E dollars. To simplify our analysis, we call
this Model A. We then build three multiple regression models. We call Model B the
model that we build from the 47 of the 90 data points that do have cost growth. We apply
a log transformation to the response variable in this model to correct for
heteroskedasticity in the residual plot. We build Model C as an alternative to Model B.
Model C is the same as Model B except that we do not transform the response variable.
Model D represents what would happen if we skip logistic regression and use stepwise
and multiple regression on all 90 data points (ignoring the problems of heteroskedasticity
in the residuals, and ignoring the fact that we do not desire to predict negative cost
growth).
Chapter Summary
This chapter sets forth our analytical process. In it we demonstrate the tie
between the literature review and the analysis we perform. Further, we explore the
credibility of the SAR data, describe the process by which we compile the data into a
useable spreadsheet format, and describe the predictor variables that we will investigate
in our models. Finally we explain the reasoning for our use of logistic and multiple
regression techniques and the process into which we incorporate these techniques.
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IV. Results and Discussion

Chapter Overview
This chapter explicates the results of both the logistic and multiple regression
analysis. In it we describe the resulting models and their robustness. We also analyze the
models for statistical validity and practical usefulness. We evaluate all four families of
models (A, B, C, and D) for each number of predictor variables we use. We name the
resulting models after the family and number of variables we use. For example, A.l
refers to the logistic regression model that uses only one predictor variable, and B.3 refers
to the multiple regression model that has three predictor variables using data from only
those programs that have cost growth and for which we perform a natural log
transformation on the response variable.
Preliminary Data Analysis
Initially, we set out to produce only one model that will predict the amount of
engineering cost growth a program will incur given certain program characteristics. To
do this, we plan to use multiple regression. However, a look at the distribution of the
response variable Engineering % via Figure 5 reveals a mixed distribution: it has a
discrete mass at zero and a continuous distribution elsewhere. As we discuss in Chapter
III, this propels us to explore the possibility that a two-step model might produce superior
results. Thus, we formulate Model A for use in determining whether a program will have
cost growth or not, followed by Model B to determine how much cost growth will occur
if Model A indicates cost growth will occur. Model C is an option that we compare to
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Model B, and we create Model D as an option to using either A alone (in the case that it
predicts no cost growth), A and B together, or A and C together. We start our analysis
with Model A and work our way alphabetically to Model D.
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Figure 5. Stem and Leaf Plot of Y (Engineering %, stem in 100's, leaf in 10's)
Logistic Regression Results - Model A
As mentioned in Chapter III, no stepwise-type function exists in JMP® for logistic
regression. Without this automated procedure to narrow down our predictors, we face an
enormous number of possible combinations of variables to research. In fact, using our 78
variables to explore all possible combinations of one through seven-variable models
requires over 2.6 billion independent regressions. Given the enormity of exploring all of
these combinations, we narrow our predictor combinations to only those that show the
most promise as we progress from a single-variable model to a seven-variable model.
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The process we use to narrow predictor variables deserves some attention in order
to give the reader an appreciation for its copiousness. We begin by regressing all onevariable models and recording the results. We select the best nine, one-variable models
and regress all possible two-variable models that stem from each of those nine, onevariable models. We then select the eight models that stand out among the two-variable
results and regress all possible three-variable models that stem from each of those eight,
two-variable models. We continue this process until the benefit of adding variables does
not outweigh the complexity of the resulting model.
For each number of variables we try, we have anywhere from seven to twelve
models that carry forward for regression with additional variables. This process
culminates in approximately four thousand regressions and seven generations of models one generation for each number of predictors. Within each of these seven generations,
we then compare the several candidate models and select the best model. Table 10
summarizes the statistical characteristics of the resulting models. We select these models
over other candidate models based on the measures listed in the table. The following
paragraphs discuss these measures.
Table 10. Evaluation Measures for Model A
Number of Predictors

Evaluation Measures
2

R (U)
Number of Data Points
Area Under ROC
Curve

^B*^H

0.1577
87

0.2178
87

0.2856
75

0.3256
75

0.3660
75

0.5050
61

0.6012
61

0.7678

0.7906

0.8293

0.8542

0.8659

0.9264

0.9481
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First we compare models based on R (U). This measure of fit differs in its
interpretation of R from linear models. David Garson in his online textbook explains
the difference:
There is no widely-accepted direct analog to OLS [ordinary least squares]
regression's R2. This is because an R2 measure seeks to make a statement
about the "percent of variance explained," but the variance of a
dichotomous or categorical dependent variable depends on the frequency
distribution ofthat variable. For a dichotomous dependent variable, for
instance, variance is at a maximum for a 50-50 split and the more lopsided
the split, the lower the variance. This means that R-squared measures for
logistic regressions with differing marginal distributions of their respective
dependent variables cannot be compared directly, and comparison of
logistic R-squared measures with R2 from OLS regression is also
problematic. Nonetheless, a number of logistic R-squared measures have
been proposed. (Garson, 2002:9)
Garson goes on to describe several alternative measures that give a measure comparable
to the R of OLS regression, but he mentions that these measures "are not goodness-of-fit
tests but rather attempt to measure strength of association." The R2 (U) that JMP® uses is
the difference of the negative log likelihood of the fitted model minus the negative log
likelihood of the reduced model divided by the negative log likelihood of the reduced
model. As with the traditional R2, a higher R2 (U) indicates a better model. The JMP®
help menu says about its R2 (U), "high R2 (U)s are unusual in categorical models" (JMP®,
2001: Help). Thus, we look for a high R (U) but temper our expectations in light of this
9

9

comment and understand the interpretation of the R (U) differs from that of OLS R .
The models we select all have the highest R (U)s of any of the other models within the
same generation of predictors.
Next, we consider the number of data points. The number of data points plays a
particularly important role, because the higher the number of data points, the more of our
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population we capture in our sample. Thus, our sample becomes more representative of
the population. In addition, the larger the sample size, the more predictor variables we
can add before the model becomes invalid statistically. According to Neter et al., a
model should have at least six to ten data points for every predictor used. Thus, in this
study, if a model falls below ten data points per predictor, then we carefully consider the
additional benefits to the model gained by adding the variable. Any model in which the
ratio of data points to predictors falls below six we eliminate as a possibility (Neter,
1996:437). The seven-variable model has only 8.7 data points per predictor, all the rest
have over ten data points per predictor. Thus, we carefully weigh the additional benefit
of the seventh variable in the model when selecting the best model, and we negate the
possibility of an eight-variable model.
Third, we consider the /»-value associated with the Chi-squared statistic for the
whole-model test. Garson describes this statistic as follows:
Model chi-square provides the usual significance test for a logistic model.
Model chi-square tests the null hypothesis that none of the independents
are linearly related to the log odds of the dependent. That is, model chisquare tests the null hypothesis that all population logistic regression
coefficients except the constant are zero. It is thus an overall model test
which does not assure that every independent is significant. (Garson,
2002:8)
Hence, we use this measure for the same purpose as for OLS regression - to test whether
the model as a whole predicts significantly better than the reduced model. A/»-value less
than 0.05 tells us the model has statistical significance as a predictive model. Because all
of the logistic regressions have/»-values less than 0.0001, this measure does not help us
discriminate between models. Thus, we do not include/»-values in the table.
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The last whole-model measurement we consider is the area under the receiver
operating characteristic (ROC) curve. The medical field routinely uses logistic
regression, and in particular ROC curves, so we look to their experts for insight into the
measure. Clifford S. Goodman of the Lewin Group (a medical consulting firm) provides
an interpretation of the ROC curve. The curve itself maps out the proportion of the true
positives (sensitivity) out of all actual positives versus the proportion of false positives
(1-specificity) out of actual negatives, both calculated across all possible calibrations of
the model.
In our experiment, we define a true positive as a program for which the model
correctly predicts that cost growth will occur in the fitted values. For a false positive, the
model incorrectly predicts that cost growth will occur in the fitted values. The
calibrations represent the cutoff probabilities that differentiate between whether a
program receives a one or a zero in the logistic regression. The area under the ROC
curve, then, gives an idea of the probability associated with ability of the model to
accurately predict whether a program will have cost growth, based on results from the
fitted values (Goodman, 1998: Appendix A). Of all the measures, this one has the most
pertinence, since it deals most specifically with our goal of accurately assessing whether
a program will or will not have cost growth. As with the other whole-model measures,
we find that the measure improves as we add more predictor variables through the
addition of seven predictors.
Table 11 displays the ^-values for the parameter estimates. Just as in OLS
regression, a lowers-value indicates higher statistical significance for that parameter as
an estimator of the response variable. A good model should have ^-values less than 0.05.
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In fact, we desire the ^-values as low as possible in order to hedge against over-fitting the
model (tailoring the model to the fitted data to the extent that it lessens the ability of the
model to predict the response values of the population). Only the five-variable model in
Table 11 breaches the 0.05 criterion. Because Length ofProd in Funding Yrs is
borderline significant (0.0507), we do not disqualify this variable as a candidate
estimator. Thus, we consider all the models listed in Table 11 as potential candidates for
modeling whether a program will have cost growth.
While Table 10 and Table 11 demonstrate how models fare individually against
the measurement criteria, selecting a best model requires some means of comparison
among the different levels of predictors. In order to visualize the combined impact that
the incremental addition of predictors has on the various measures of effectiveness for the
logistic model, we create Table 12. Specifically, this table shows the increase or decrease
in each evaluation measure as we add a single predictor to a given model. For example,
as we add a predictor to the model with one independent variable, we gain 0.0601 in R
(U) and our ratio of data points to the number of independent variables in the model
decreases to 43.5.
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Table 11. P-Values of Predictor Variables for Model A
„ ... w ■ , ■
Number of Predictors
Predictor Variables ^ ————MM—MMMMMM————
MEAI

IKSB

KSSB

MKIMI

HMI

0.0288

0.0059

0.0015

0.0020

0.0091

0.0043

0.0021

0.0022

0.0037

Actual Length of EMD
(MSiii-MSii in mos)

0.0175

0.0039

0.0041

0.003

0.0029

Funding Yrs of R&D
Completed

0.0006
0.0187

0.0219

0.0202

0.0148

0.0507

0.0031

0.0012

0.0334

0.0154

Maturity from MSII (in
mos)

0.0002

Length of R&D in
Funding Yrs
RAND Modification

MES

1

0.0076
0.0100

MSIII-based Maturity
of EMD %
Length of Prod in
Funding Yrs
Actual Length of EMD
(using IOC-MSII in
mos)
Land Vehicle

0.0132

Table 12. Incremental Changes in Evaluation Measures for Model A
Evaluation Measures
^BJ^I

Incremental increase in R2(U)
with additional predictor
Ratio of data points to number
of variables
Incremental increase in Area
Under ROC Curve with
additional predictor

0.1577 0.0601
87.0

43.5

^E^l

^EL^I

^Kf^l

^Kz^l

^K^^k

0.0678 0.0400 0.0404 0.1390 0.0962
25.0

18.8

15.0

10.2

8.7

0.2678 0.0228 0.0387 0.0249 0.0117 0.0605 0.0216

From Table 12, we create Figure 6 to better observe the effects of the marginal change in
the number of predictors. Figure 6 shows the changes on the whole-model measures with
each one-predictor increase. In this graph, the higher numbers indicate that the addition
of the extra predictor affects a more significant impact than that of a lower number.
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From the graph, we see similarities in the behavior of the whole-model measures. The
addition of the first predictor and the sixth predictor show the greatest increases for area
under the ROC curve and R (U). Both measures have relatively low marginal gains at
the addition of predictors four and five.

3

4
Number of Predictors

■Incremental increase in R-squared (U) with additional predictor
■Incremental increase in Area Under ROC Curve with additional predictor

Figure 6. Incremental Changes in Whole-model Measures for Model A
We view with particular interest the spike in the measures at variable six and the
drop-off at the addition of variable seven. Specifically, we see an increase in the R (U)
of 0.139, which increases significantly the association between the six-variable model
and the outcomes. Secondly, this model increases the probability under the ROC curve
by 0.06048 to 0.92641, making the probability of capturing all true positives high and the
probability of having false positives low. Therefore, the gains of adding the sixth
variable outweigh the complication of the model by adding the sixth variable. Because
we desire to maximize our ability to correctly predict whether a program will have cost

growth, we consider whether the seven-variable model might satisfy our needs without
over-fitting the model.
Upon first glance, the drop in marginal return for the addition of the seventh
variable seems an indication that such a model over-fits the data. In addition, earlier in
this text we convey concerns about the ratio of data points to independent variables. On
the other hand, the amount of increase in R (U) approaches 0.1, a measurable increase,
and it accounts for the possible cost growth associated with a land vehicle. For these
reasons, we preliminarily consider the seven-variable model as the best model, based on
the whole-model measures (Appendix A). Validation of the models will show whether
this conclusion will perdure.
For validation, we use 25 data points that we randomly select from the original
115-point data set. Of these 25 data points, 12 data points have missing values for some
of the variables, leaving 13 for validation. These 13 data points represent approximately
17.6 percent of the 61 viable data points the model uses. Although we fail to meet our
goal of validating using 20 percent of the data, we are relatively close to this goal. Thus,
we have a reasonable degree of confidence in the results.
The validation process entails saving the functionally predicted values ('0' or '1')
in JMP® for each of the validation data points and comparing those values to the actual
values. JMP® computes the predicted values by assessing the probability of having cost
growth. JMP® assigns a ' 1' to any point with a probability of 0.5 or greater and a '0'
otherwise. The user can change these defaults to make the model more or less
conservative, but in our case, we use the default setting of 0.5. Upon validation, the
model accurately predicts nine out of the 13 data points for a success rate of 69 percent,
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further evidencing that this model has some predictive ability, and establishing it as our
best model (Appendix A).
Multiple Regression Results - Model B
We build model B for those situations where a decision maker knows that a
program will have cost growth and wants to know the amount of expected cost growth
the program. To build this model, we start with our randomly selected 90 data points and
exclude programs that have no cost growth, leaving us with 47 data points. Using only
these points should give the model more accuracy to predict, since it prevents data points
outside the range of interest from skewing the results. We use the same pool of candidate
predictor variables as in Model A, and for the 7 variable we use Engineering %, which
measures the percent increase of engineering cost growth from the DE.
Upon a preliminary analysis of the data, we notice the 7 variable does not have a
normal distribution (Figure 7). In fact, 7 exhibits more of a lognormal distribution.
Running a few test regressions reveals that strong patterns exist in the residual plots
(Figure 7). The plots fail the Breusch-Pagan test (for constancy of variance) by large
margins (Neter, 1996:115). Based on these findings, we perform a natural log
transformation of the 7 variable. This transformation successfully dispels the
heteroskedasticity previously found (Figure 8). The transformation also results in a
distribution shape much closer to normal, though still slightly skewed right. The
Shapiro-Wilk test indicates the normal distribution sufficiently fits the data at an alpha of
0.05 (Figure 8). We use this natural log transformation for all Model B regressions.
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Figure 7. Distribution of Fand Residual Plot of Untransformed Model B
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Figure 8. Distribution of Log Fand Residual Plot of Transformed Model B
Stepwise regression helps us narrow the predictor variables. Since we start with
only 47 data points, we limit the number of predictors to five in order to keep the
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predictor to data point ratio from going too far below ten to one (Neter et al., 1996:437).
We produce several regression models for each number of predictors, just as we do for
Model A. We then choose the model that provides the best predictability while
maintaining statistical significance as a model. We summarize the results of the best
regressions for each generation of variables in Table 13 and Table 14.
Table 13. Evaluation Measures for Model B
Number of Predictors

Evaluation Measures
R2Adj
Number of Data Points
P-Value ANOVA

0.2200
46
0.0006

0.3386
46
0.0001

0.4645
42
0.0001

0.4743
42
0.0001

0.4934
43
0.0001

Table 14. P-Values of Predictor Variables for Model B
1
Number of Predictors
1
rrcdictor Variable ^^^gg^^g^jg^g^?|^g^j^
Maturity from MSII (in
mos)
NoMajDefKTR

0.0006

0.0018

0.0069

0.0015

0.0047

0.0024

0.0004

0.0410

0.0069
0.0355

PAUC
Class At least S
Svs>1
R&D Funding Yr
Maturity %
Total Funding Yr
Maturity %

0.0068
0.0004
0.0273
0.0029
0.0024

We find all of these models comply with the underlying assumptions of constant
variance and normality for linear regression at an alpha of 0.05. We assume
independence for no obvious serial correlation is present, and we have removed
dependent programs in the data set. In addition, we test the predictors for
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multicollinearity by ensuring that all variance inflation factors (VlFs) as calculated by
JMP® are less than ten (Neter, 1996:387).
From Table 13, we notice a few general patterns in the data. First, as the number
of variables increases, the adjusted R increases. This indicates that the model explains
more of the variance as we add variables up to five. Also, the number of viable data
points decreases to 42 when we add the third variable, but it does not decrease thereafter.
The emolument in predictive power gained by adding that third variable warrants such an
addition, and for variables four and five adjusted R increases free from trade-off in data.
In fact, the five-variable model adds a data point. The analysis of variance (ANOVA)/?vaiue remains constant for all generations of predictors save the first; thus, this measure
does not help us discriminate. A look at the significance levels of the predictor variables
in Table 14 shows that all predictors significantly add to the model at an alpha level of
0.05. The least significant of the predictors, PAUC, occurs in Model B.3, with a
significance of 0.0410. As with Model A, we chart the changes in these measures (Table
15).
Table 15. Incremental Changes in Evaluation Measures for Model B

Incremental increase in R
Adj with additional predictor
Ratio of data points to
number of variables

0.2200 0.1186 0.1259 0.0098 0.0191
46.0

23.0

14.0

10.5

8.6

From Table 15, we see the largest marginal increase in adjusted R at variable one
and the smallest at variable four. A fourth variable increases adjusted R by less than
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0.01. This modest increase in adjusted R does not call for the addition of a fourth
variable. Thus, Model B.3 represents the model where the costs of adding more predictor
variables exceed the predictive benefits according to the measures we have before
validation.
For validation, we use the same data as for Model A. Only 14 out of the original
25 validation data points have cost growth; the other 11 do not. The 14 represent roughly
25 percent of the overall data used to create the model plus the validation points, giving
us enough points to result in a credible validation. During model validation, the first two
models use all 14 data points, while the last three only use 13 because of missing data for
some of the predictor variables.
For validation of the range estimates, we originally consider 95 percent prediction
intervals (Pis). However, after back-transforming the 7 via the natural exponential
function, we find these Pis impractically wide in some cases. In order to compensate
somewhat for the wide Pis, we use an 80 percent PL We believe this smaller interval will
prove more useful to a user. For an 80 percent interval, we expect to see about 80 percent
of the validation data points fall within it. For the models that use less data points
(usually those with a higher number of variables in the model), we expect to see fewer
data points fall within the Pis because of the increased variability associated with smaller
sample sizes. Table 16 displays the results of our validation.
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Table 16. Validation Measures for Model B
Number of Variables

Validation
Measures

|

Obs Within 80% PI
Avg Width of PI
(Eng %)

78.57%

78.57% 69.23% 69.23% 61.54%

59.59%

82.37% 75.67% 86.29% 61.88%

Obs Below 90% UB

100.00%

100.00% 92.31% 92.31% 84.62%

Obs Above 90% LB
Mean Absolute
Deviation

78.57%

78.57% 76.92% 76.92% 76.92%

18.88%

17.23%

18.24% 19.23%

19.01%

The first four measures in this table assess the appropriateness of the model for
the validation data, while the last measure assesses the appropriateness of the model for
both the data used to build the model and the validation data. The first two measures tell
us the percent of observations that fall within the 80 percent PI and the average width of
the PI respectively. The next two measures relate closely to the first two. The first of
these assesses the percent of observations that fall below a 90 percent upper bound (UB),
and the other measure assesses the percent of observations that fall above a 90 percent
lower bound (LB).
From these measures we discover the data points tend to violate the lower bound
more than the upper bound. That is, we empirically expect to see 90 percent of the data
fall in both categories. For the UB, the model meets this expectation. For the LB, it is
not. Considering the small validation sample size and the skewed right property of a
lognormal distribution, this trend is not unexpected and not a source of concern.
With respect to usefulness for a cost estimator, we investigate the average PI
widths and mean absolute deviation. The average PI widths, measured in engineering
cost growth as a percent of the DE, vary from the low 60's to the high 80's. This

represents a considerable spread, and highlights the variability still present in modeling
Engineering %. This variability coupled with small validation sample size suggests this
descriptive measure has limited usefulness as a comparison tool.
The final measure in Table 16, the mean absolute deviation, assesses the accuracy
of the point estimate. We calculate it using the formula, ^\ predicted (i) - actual(z')| In,
for all 115 data points. We measure the mean absolute deviation in percent engineering
cost growth, so interpretation proves straightforward. The lower the mean absolute
deviation, the better the model's predicted values fit the entire data set. Mean absolute
deviation gives a measure to compare with adjusted R to see how the models fit with
validation data versus without.
In general, the two-variable model has a slightly better mean absolute deviation
than the three-variable model. However, this difference does not induce us to overturn
our initial assessment of Model B.3 as the best model in terms of adjusted R . Thus,
although all five models perform reasonably well in predicting the percent of engineering
cost growth, Model B.3 performs most efficaciously (see Appendix B for model).
Multiple Regression Results - Model C
As demonstrated in the previous section, Model B performs fairly well as a
predictive formula. In order to compare Model B to a more simplistic regression
approach, which we show later is an incorrect methodology, we attempt to regress using a
model with a non-transformed Y, which we call Model C. We use stepwise regression to
narrow the predictors, and then we use OLS regression to build our models, just as in
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Model B. All conditions of the regression procedure remain the same for C as for B, with
the exception of the 7 transformation.
We attempt several models for each number of variables. None of the models we
attempt passes the Shapiro- Wilk test for normality of residuals, and none of the models
passes the Breush-Pagan test for constancy of variance (both at an alpha of 0.05). In
addition, in almost every model we attempt, an influential outlier exists, which is defined
as having a Cook's Distance greater than 0.5 (Neter, 1996:381). Most of the time
removing the outlier leads to several other influential outliers. Thus, we could not avoid
violations of the basic principles that underlie OLS regression; Figure 9 shows an
example of such violations.
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Figure 9. Cook's Distance and Residual Plot of Model C
Table 17 contains the best model for each number of predictors. Within these
results, all models violate normality and constancy of variance, and Models C.l, C.4, and
C.5 contain influential outliers that we cannot neutralize by exclusion of the influential

90

data point. Although regression and ANOVA are robust techniques for violations of
normality and constant variance, our inferential diagnostics, such as ^-values and
prediction intervals may be invalid. Consequently, caution is warranted. Model C.2
originally has an influential outlier, but by removing the Bradley Fighting Vehicle
M2/M3 we satisfy the Cook's Distance threshold with a measure of 0.46. Model C.3 also
scarcely meets the influential outlier threshold with a Cook's Distances of 0.5.
Table 17. Evaluation Measures for Model C
Evaluation
Measures
2

R Adi
Number of Data
Points
P-Value ANOVA

in

Number of Predictors
—

0.1924

0.3120

0.3000

'
0.3988

0.4365

41

47

38

38

38

0.0024

0.0001

0.0016

0.0003

0.0002

The adjusted R measure varies between 0.19 and 0.44. Interestingly, the adjusted
R decreases slightly with the addition of the third variable. All the models use a good
portion of the available data points. The five-variable model uses 38 data points, giving
it a ratio of about 7.6 data points per variable. This ratio approaches the limits of
adequacy for a data point to variable ratio, nevertheless, we keep the model for
consideration.
Table 18 shows that the specific predictor variables Model C uses vary
considerably with the number of predictors. From the table, we also notice a wide spread
in the ^-values of the predictors. A cursory examination of the ^-values reveals that the
four-variable model has a predictor with questionable significance at an alpha level of
0.05, and Model C.5 has two with questionable significance at that alpha. Moreover,
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Model C.5 has one variable with a significance level well above 0.05 and approaching
0.10. The models have comparable ANOVA ^-values, with C.l being slightly larger.
Thus, we use adjusted R to discriminate among the models.
Table 18. P-Values of Predictor Variables for Model C
Number of Predictors

Predictors
IOC-Based Maturity
ofEMD%
NoMajDefKTR
Funding Yrs Prod
Completed
Maturity from MSII
in mos

^^^^i^^a

mm

0.0024
0.0075

0.0153

0.0362

0.0026

0.0027
0.0006

0.0180

Actual Length of
EMD MSII-MSIII in
mos
MSIII-based
Maturity %
Air
Land
Class at Least S

0.0514

0.0190
0.0012
0.0136

0.0946
0.0462

Versions Previous to
SAR

0.0547

Table 19 shows a considerable rise in adjusted R at the addition of variables one,
two, and four (also see Figure 10). Variable three induces a very slight fall in adjusted
9

R , while the addition of the fifth variable brings a relatively small increase in adjusted R

9

which does not outweigh the worsening of the data point to variable ratio which it causes.
From this information, we eliminate the five-variable model. We also eliminate the onevariable model, because the gains in adjusted R of the two-variable model warrant
superceding C.l. The predictor, Versions Previous to SAR, in Model C.4 barely surpass
significance at alpha of 0.05. Despite this slight breach in significance, we select Model
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C.4 as the most promising pre-validation model, because the increase of adjusted R from
approximately 0.31 to 0.40 improves the model's predictive ability.
Table 19. Incremental Changes in Evaluation Measures Model C
Number of Predictors

Evaluation Measures
Incremental increase in R2
Adj with additional predictor
Ratio of data points to
number of variables

„
2
|
<P

0.1924

0.1196

-0.0120

0.0988

0.0378

41.0

23.5

12.7

9.5

7.6

0.5 |
0.45 |
0.4
0-35
0.3
0.25
0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
0 -I
Number of Variables

Figure 10. Changes in Adjusted R for Model C
We use the same procedures and data to validate Model C as those for Model B.
Validation of the model yields the results shown in Table 20. The models all do fairly
well at range prediction of the validation data: on average about 79 percent of the
validation data lies within the intervals of each model. The average widths of the
intervals range from 64 to 92 percent, again problematically wide, and the models seem
to predict below the upper bound and above the lower bound equally well. Although
Model C.4 fares the worst in this measure, all models fare similarly, and the difference
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does not have a magnitude such that by itself it changes our assessment of C.4 as the best
model.
Table 20. Validation Measures for Model C
..,.,.,,
Obs Within 80% PI
AvgWidthofPl(Eng%)
Obs Below 90% UB
Obs Above 90% LB
Mean Absolute Deviation

1

Number of Variables
— ni»
■■■■■■■■■■
92.31% 64.29%
91.78% 64.40%
92.31% 85.71%
100.00% 78.57%
22.55% 21.81%

81.82% 72.73%
84.03% 78.61%
90.91% 81.82%
90.91% 90.91%
24.11% 25.70%

1

81.82%
77.51%
90.91%
90.91%
23.74%

Comparison of Models B and C
Figure 11 compares the adjusted R at each predictor level. For Models B and C,
for all levels of predictors, Model B outperforms Model C in this measure. Model B.3
even exceeds the predictive capabilities of the four and five-variable versions of Model
C. A comparison of the mean absolute deviations yields similar results: Model B's mean
absolute deviations are smaller at all levels of the predictors (Figure 12). Unlike adjusted
R , the mean absolute deviation takes into account the validation points in its assessment
of fit. Thus, this measure tends to give a better idea of the population fit of the model,
since it includes more of the population. For both measures of point estimation accuracy,
Model B's performance exceeds that of Model C for each level of predictor.
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Figure 11. Comparison of Adjusted R for Models B and C
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Figure 12. Comparison of Mean Absolute Deviation for Models B and C
The lack of consistency of predictor variables in Model C contrasts with the more
consistent Model B. No Maj DefKTR appears in Models C.2 through C.5, and Funding
Yrs Prod Completed and Actual Length ofEMD MS III-MSII in mos repeat once in the
family of C models. Beyond these variables, no consistency exists. Model B, however,
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repeats the use ofMaturity from MS II (in mos) and No Maj DefKTR four times each.
This model also uses PAUC three times. Thus, the results of the parameter selection of
Model C appear somewhat more erratic than those of Model B.
For interval estimation, we rely on the validation results of the two families of
models (Table 16 and Table 20). We notice first that the mean of the average widths of
the Pis for Model B equals 74.84 percent, while the mean of the average widths of the Pis
for Model C equals 79.27 percent. These measures do not differ much, and the
difficulties associated with comparing the prediction intervals (i.e., lack of customary
OLS assumptions with Model C) lead us to assign to this observation only minor
influence in our decision-making.
We do not expect the non-transformed model to possess comparable range
estimates, because of the violations of the normality and constant variance assumptions
of OLS regression. Surprisingly, Model C seemingly performs on par with Model B
during validation (Figure 13). However, the PI that Model C produces does not represent
a true 80 percent PI, because of the violation of the assumptions of the OLS model.
Although we witness that Model C's Pis do well at capturing the validation data, we do
not really know in fact what prediction level the interval represents. This inferential
uncertainty coupled with the results from Figure 13 and Figure 14 leads us to support the
use of Model B over Model C as both a point estimator and a range estimator.
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Figure 13. Comparison of Pis for Models B and C
Multiple Regression Results - Model D
We develop Model D to investigate the consequences of not recognizing the
mixture distribution of Engineering % (continuous and discrete) and overlooking the
theories underlying OLS regression, which require a reasonable assumption of both
normality and homoskedasticity in the residuals. Model D uses all 90 data points to
develop a one-step approach to determining the amount of cost growth that a program
will incur. As such, the model produces both negative and positive values for expected
cost growth.
Tables 21 and 22 list the best models that we discover through stepwise and OLS
regression for each predictor level. In our regressions we find not even one version of
Model D that meets the normality and homoskedasticity requirements. Neither do we
find a model without influential outliers or with influential outliers that we can remedy
through extraction from the data set. We attempt several transformations of the model in
order to make the variance constant, but all attempts fail such that the resulting
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transformation fares worse in a Breusch-Pagan test than the original equation. In other
words, Tables 21 and 22 contain nine models which have no statistical grounding, but for
which we evaluate their ability to predict cost growth from a pragmatic perspective.
Table 21. Evaluation Measures for Model D
Evaluation
Measures
R2Adj
Number of
Data
Points

Number of Predictors

|

'££$*. ^t^,m'm:^im,^m,m^,^iM,mm,mmd
0.1760

0.2266

0.3139

0.3543

0.3280

0.3931

0.3932

0.3869

0.4051

90

90

81

81

70

70

70

70

70

Table 22. P-Values of Predictor Variables for Model D
Number of Predictors

|

:i^Älil?^^Ä^^S^ÄÄÄ^^&iÄSÄM
Funding Yrs Prod
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
0.0001
Completed
0.0109 0.0026 0.0054
0.0091 0.0181 0.0260
NoMajDefKTR
0.0088 0.0162 0.0161 0.0010 0.0003 0.0225
Total Quantity
0.0183 0.0236
0.0260
Risk Mitigation?
Actual Length of EMD
0.0330 0.0310 0.0098
MSIII-MSII in mos
Maturity (Funding Yrs
0.0008
Complete)
# Product Variants in
0.0082
0.0269
this SAR
0.0157 0.0684
Munition
0.0374
Class at Least S
Funding Yrs R&D
0.0001
Completed
Versions Previous to
0.0472
SAR
0.0440
Heb
MSIII-based Maturity
0.0002
ofEMD%
0.0348
N Involvement?
0.0129
Class C

0.0176
0.0329
0.0087

0.0141

0.0002

0.0235
0.0094
0.0891 0.0487
0.0955

Class U
Litton
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From Table 21, we see the general trends of the overall increase in adjusted R
with the addition of predictors and the general decrease in the number of data points from
90 to 70 as we increase the number of predictors. Though not listed in this chart, allpvaiues for ANOVA have consistency at the value of 0.0001. We caveat this assessment
with the reminder that we view these measures as dubious because of the lack of a
theoretical foundation for these models resulting from their failing of normality and
constant variance tests.
In Table 23, we see more of a variety of predictor variables than in A, B, or C. In
part, this diversity stems from the fact that for Model D we attempt up to a nine-predictor
model. However, comparing the range of variables attempted for Models D.l through
D.7 with A. 1 through A.7 reveals that Model D uses a third more predictor variables for
this range of models than does Model A. We also note that through Model D.6, all
predictors have significants-values. The last three models have at least one statistically
insignificant predictor at an alpha level of 0.05. Theses-values have the same problem
as the other inferential statistical measures the model generates: without constancy of
variance and normally distributed residuals, these ^-values are potentially erroneous. To
what degree they are erroneous, we cannot know. Table 23 shows incremental changes
in the model evaluation measures.
Table 23. Incremental Changes in Evaluation Measures for Model D
Evaluation Measures

kllfcll

Number of Predictors
1
.
&^B^^WJÜ:M^.:.'&^:^A

Incremental increase in
R2 Adj with additional
0.1760 0.0507 0.0873 0.0403 -0.0263 0.0651 0.0002 -0.0063 0.0182
predictor
Ratio of data points to
90.0 45.0
27.0
20.3
14.0
10.0
8.8
7.8
11.7
number of variables
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We first evaluate how much of the variance of the response variable {Engineering
%) the model explains through an investigation of the adjusted R measure. In general,
we see the adjusted R increase as the number of predictors increases. Figure 14 shows
the incremental trend more clearly. As the figure shows, the first variable adds the most
9

9

to adjusted R , while the five and eight-variable models actually decrease adjusted R .
This information combined with the fact that the seven and nine-variable models do not
add much explanation of the variance, leads us to consider either Models D.4 or D.6 as
the best models in terms of predictive efficiency alone. We explore the potential
significance of the predictors to help us differentiate between the models.
0.45 i

4

5

6

Number of Variables

Figure 14. Changes in Adjusted R for Model D
Figure 15 shows how the ^-values for the least significant predictor and the
averages-values change with the addition of predictors to the model. The horizontal line
marks the upper limit for a significant model at the 0.05 alpha level. Both Models D.4
and D.6 meet this criterion of significance. We note that the least significant/>vaiue in
Model D.6 is double that of Model D.4. However, the averages-value of D.6 remains
fairly low (even though one others-value breaches 0.03). The fact that thes-value of
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D.6 meets the 0.05 criterion, combined with the fact Model D.4 explains only 35 percent
of the variance tempts us to accept D.6 over D.4 in order to boost adjusted R to 0.39.
However, Table 23 shows that going from Model D.4 to D.6 involves dropping the
predictor to data point ratio almost in half from 20.3 to 11.7. We view this drastic
decrease along with the modest increase in adjusted R after the addition of the sixth
variable as evidence of over-fitting. Thus, discounting the uncertainty associated with the
evaluation measures resulting from the unmet model assumptions, D.4 proves the most
efficient predictor in the family of the D models.
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6

Number of Variables
♦

P-Value of least significant predictor'

■Significance Limit (0.05)

Average P-Value of Predictors

Figure 15. Evaluation of Predictor Variable P-Values at a Significance of 0.05
For validation of the data, we perform the same procedures as with Models B and
C, and we use the same 25 data points. Unlike Models B and C, this model does not
buttress itself upon the assumption that a program will have cost growth. Thus, we do
not exclude the 11 validation data points that do not have cost growth. In Table 24 we
summarize the results of the validation.
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Table 24. Validation Measures for Model D
Validation
Measures
Obs Within
80% PI

Number of Variables

HKBBHHBKHHBKSHSKM
92.00% 92.00%

86.96%

86.96% 77.78% 77.78% 72.22% 72.22% 72.22%

Avg Width of 79.99% 78.01%
PI (Eng %)

79.72%

78.22% 79.95% 76.38% 76.80% 77.33% 78.36%

Obs Below
90% UB

86.96%

86.96% 77.78% 83.33% 83.33% 77.78% 77.78%

Obs Above
90% LB
Mean Abs
Deviation

1

92.00% 92.00%

100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 94.44% 88.89% 94.44% 94.44%
16.43%

16.93%

19.37%

19.32% 20.09% 19.94% 20.49% 20.97% 20.44%

The results of the range estimation (first four validation measures) show a
decrease in ability as the model grows. This is in keeping with the decreasing ratio of
data points to variables. The chart shows that the Pis perform adequately, with the LBs
capturing all the validation points a majority of the time. The chart also shows that the
average width of the Pis remain fairly constant at a width comparable to Models A, B,
and C. The mean absolute deviation varies from 16.43 to 20.97 percent. From the
measures in Table 24, we do not see enough difference between the models to overturn
the previous illation of Model D.4 as the best of the nine models.
Discussion of Models A, B, C, and D
As we point out previously, Models A and B represent the results of obeying the
rules of inferential statistics in compiling cost growth models, while Models C and D
serve as examples of what happens when we overlook these rules by blindly applying
standard regression techniques. Earlier in this chapter we compare Model B with Model
C to show that Model B outperforms Model C as a predictive model in both point and
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range estimation. We now compare Model D as a single-step predictive tool with the
two-step approach of using Models A and B to predict whether cost growth will occur
and to what degree it will occur. Such a comparison proves difficult and inexact, because
the models differ in their methodologies as well as their measures of accuracy, yet we
attempt as objective an approach as possible.
Model A produces only binary outcomes, '0' or T. One can think of Model D in a
similar manner: if Model D predicts a point estimate of zero or less, then we say that
Model D predicts a program to have no cost growth. We use Models D.4 and A.7 for the
comparison. When we compare the results of the validation using this normalization of
Model D's output, we find that Model D's prediction abilities compare well with Model
A's on the whole (Table 25). On average, Model A correctly predicts 66.06 percent of
the validation points, while Model D correctly predicts 62.87 percent.
Table 25. Percent of Validation Points Correctly Identified as Having or Not
Having Cost Growth
o/ \i i-A *■

r\ * \

Number of Variables

Correctly Predicted 60.00% 64.00% 61.10% 72.22% 66.67% 69.23% 69.23%
by A
Correctly Predicted 68.00% 72.00% 65.22% 60.87% 50.00% 61.11%
byD

Table 25 seems to indicate that the failure of the normality and constancy of
variance assumptions have little effect on the usefulness of the model. Model D.4 proves
itself not far inferior to Model A.7 in predicting cost growth. Because of the foundational
differences in the model measures, we find this validation procedure the only reasonable
quantitative comparison of the two models.
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When we consider the performance of Model D versus the performance of Model
B at point estimation accuracy, Model D's results do not compete as well. We find first
that Model B produces higher adjusted R values than Model D as we show in Figure 16.
Model B yields more predictive ability for the number of variables, and none of Model
D's versions can compare to the versions of Model B above two predictor variables.
Specifically looking at the results of the best model for B, B.3, and the best model for D,
D.4, we find that B.3 has an adjusted R value 0.11 higher than D.4, representing an
increase in relative predictive power of 31 percent over D.4.
0.6 T-
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Number of Variables
- Model D
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Figure 16. Comparison of Adjusted R for Models B and D
Mean absolute deviation for both models paints a slightly different picture (Figure
17). From these results, we see little distinction between the models. Mean absolute
deviation for Model B.3 equals 18.24 percent, smaller that of D.4 which equals 19.32
percent. Thus, on average, the deviations of the actual values from the predicted values
of B.3 are about one percent less than D.4's. These results support the results from the
adjusted R comparison, concluding B.3 as the better model functionally.
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Figure 17. Comparison of Mean Absolute Deviation for Models B and D
In terms of interval estimation (Table 16 and Table 24), Model B outperforms
Model D at predicting UBs, while the opposite is true of LBs. Overall, Model D captures
a higher percentage of the validation data points within its intervals than does Model B.
From these measures, Model D appears to compare very well with Model B in measures
of interval estimation. However, one must temper these results first with the fact that
Model D uses all 25 validation points, while Model B only uses about half of those data
points. These additional data points include negative and zero values. Thus, the
comparison between the two model validations has integrity problems.
Following this, Model D predicts intervals that include negative and zero values
while at the same time including positive numbers; this jumble of positive, negative, and
zero values makes the results difficult to interpret. Finally, and most important, Model D
does not actually produce 80 percent Pis. OLS regression produces Pis based on the
assumption that residuals have a normal distribution with a constant variance. Since
Model D satisfies neither of these requisites, we have no idea what percentage to assign
105

to these intervals. Therefore, Model D appears to perform well, but because we have no
idea what exactly it performs, we do not recommend its use. In sum, one might think of
Model D like a three-legged dog: it is not put together quite right, but it can be useful.
Discussion of Variables
Until now, this chapter focuses on the model-building and selection process. Now
we turn our attention to the variables we use to build these models. Table 26 summarizes
the variables used in each of the models described earlier in this chapter. This chart lists
overall average significance of each predictor used in Models A through D for all levels
of the predictors. The chart also includes the number of times the models use each
predictor. We create Figure 18 and Figure 19 to portray how the average significance
level and how the frequency of use change from predictor to predictor. These images
give an understanding of the number of different predictors that show significant results
in predicting engineering cost growth and how often the models use each variable.
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Table 26. Significance and Frequency of Predictors for Models A, B, C, and D
I'riilkliii'

Mean Siumfunnii'

Funding Yrs of R&D
Completed

0 0004

Funding Yrs Prod
Completed
Maturity (Funding Yrs
Complete)
Total Funding Yr
Maturity %

0.0005

IOC-Based Maturity of
EMD%
R&D Funding Yr
Maturity %

0.0024

I'riilkliii'

MSIII-based Maturity of
EMD%

0.0024

0.0029

10

Total Quantity
MSIII-based Maturity of
EMD%

7

Maturity from MSIL (in mos)
Funding Yrs Prod
Completed
Length of R&D in Funding
Yrs

7

RAND Modification

5

Risk Mitigation?

4

Class At least S
Length of Prod in Funding
Yrs

3

7

7
5

0.0096
0.0110

No Ma( DefKTR
0.0112
0.0132
0.0136
0.0140

Total Quantity
PAUC
# Product Variants in
this SAR

15

Actual Length of'EMD
(MSIII-MSIIinmos)

0.0052

0.0110

Class C
Land Vehicle
Ail-

No Ma( DefKTR

0.0008

0.0043
RAND Modification
Maturity from MSIl (in
mos)
Length of R&D in
Funding Yrs

l-rniiii'iti'N (Out of
2d MIHII-N)

0.0161

3

# Product Variants in this
SAR
PAUC
Class U

3
3
2

Versions Previous to SAR

2

Munition

2

N Involvement?

2

Actual Length of'EMD
(using IOC-MSII in mos)

2

0.0164
0.0176

Actual Length of'EMD
(MSIII-MSIIinmos)
Length of Prod in
Funding Yrs

0.0183
0.0192

Risk Mitigation?
Actual Length of'EMD
(using IOC-MSII in mos)
Svs>l
N Involvement?
Class At least S
Munition
Helo
Versions Previous to
SAR

Class C
Funding Yrs of R&D
Completed

2

Litton
Land
Helo

1
1
1

Svs>l
AilLand Vehicle

1
1
1

2

0.0244
0.0273
0.0292
0.0397
0.0421
0.0440
0.0510

R&D Funding Yr Maturity

%
0.0689

1

IOC-Based Maturity of'EMD

%

Class U
0.0946

1

Total Funding Yr Maturity

Land
0.0955
Litton
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%

1

Maturity (Funding Yrs
Complete)

1

From Figure 18, we see certain break points where the mean significance measure
increases relatively abruptly. The first of these break points occurs after the third
predictor. Those variables before this break point we consider as the most significant
predictors. We find that all of these variables represent a schedule measure in terms of
funding years completed. Between the eighth and ninth variables we see another break.
Within the first eight variables, only the indicator variable for modification programs is
not schedule related. Thus, we see that schedule criteria dominate the prediction of cost
growth. The chart also clearly shows that some of the predictors we use in the models do
not have a mean significance at the alpha level of 0.05; these variables have a borderline
ability to predict cost growth at best.
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»Mean Significance •■■■■■■Alpha Leve!

Figure 18. Mean Significance of Predictors for Models A, B, C, and D
Figure 19 displays the frequency of the predictors in the models. From the graph,
one can see that a third of the variables occur only once, another third occur two to three
times, and a final third occurs from four to fifteen times in the models. Looking at the
most frequent third of the variables, schedule variables again appear quite often in the
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models. Other than schedule variables, the modification identifier, total quantity,
whether a major defense contractor worked on the program, and whether engineering risk
mitigation existed in the program all occur often in the models. Information from Table
26 and its accompanying figures adverts the reader to variables that tend to predict cost
growth best. However, we suggest caution in arriving at conclusions from this data, since
the data contains predictors from the statistically questionable Models C and D. A
focused look at Models A and B yields more colorable results.
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Figure 19. Frequency of Predictors for Models A, B, C, and D
Table 27 displays the predictors of Models A and B. As in the previous table,
schedule variables dominate as the most significant and frequent variables used. Within
these schedule variables we also find that the modification variable and whether a major
defense contractor participated in the program demonstrate relatively high frequency and
significance as predictors of cost growth. Service management variables, variables
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describing physical characteristics and domain of operation, and concurrency variables
do not appear on the list of variables used.
Table 27. Significance and Frequency of Predictors for Models A and B

IVi'ilitlor

Mi:lll
MüiiifiiMiHi'

Funding Yrs of R&D Completed

0.0006

Total Funding Yr Maturity %

0.0024

R&D Funding Yr Maturity %

I'mliclnr

1 l't'l|IK'II('\ (Olli

i.l 12 MIMII-N)
6

0.0029

Maturity from MSII (in mos)
Length of R&D in Funding
Yrs
Actual Length ofEMD
(MSIII-MSIIinmos)

Maturity from MSII (in mos)

0.0031

RAND Modification

5

No Maj DefKTR

0.0036

4

RAND Modification
Actual Length ofEMD (MSIIIMS1I in mos)

0.0043

No Maj DefKTR
MS/II-based Maturity of
EMD%

3

Length of R&D in Funding Yrs

0.0096

Land Vehicle

0.0132

PAUC
Length of Prod in Funding
Yrs
Actual Length ofEMD
(using IOC-MSII in mos)

PAUC
Length of Prod in Funding Yrs
MSIII-hased Maturity ofEMD %
Actual Length ofEMD (using
IOC-MSII in mos)
Svs>l

0.0161
0.0183
0.0189

Class At least S
Svs>l
R&D Funding Yr Maturity %

1
1
1

0.0244
0.0273

1
1

Class At least S

0.0355

Total Funding Yr Maturity %
Land Vehicle
Funding Yrs of R&D
Completed

0.0063

5
5

4

3
2

1

In order to compose a single list of ranked predictors based on both mean
significance and frequency, we develop a measure that weights the mean significance of
the variables by the frequency of use. We call the measure Overall Importance (OI), and
we calculate it by dividing the significance of a predictor by its frequency. This equation
simplifies to the sum of the significance values divided by the frequency squared. The
resulting number has no meaning outside its ability to stratify the data according to
significance weighted by frequency. Table 28 displays the results of the predictors
ranked by OI.
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Table 28. Overall Importance of Predictors Models A and B
rmlicnn"
Maturity from MSIl (in
mos)
Funding Yrs of R&D
Completed

ni
0.0005
0.0006

RAND Modification
No Maj DefKTR
Actual Length of'EMD
(MSIII-MSIIinmos)
Length of R&D in Funding
Yrs
Total Funding Yr Maturity

0.0009
0.0009

%

0.0024

0.0013
0.0019

R&D Funding Yr Maturity

%

0.0029

MSILL-based Maturity of
EMD%
PAUC
Length of Prod in Funding
Yrs
Actual Length of'EMD
(using IOC-MSII in mos)
Land Vehicle
Svs>!
Class At least S

0.0047
0.0054
0.0061
0.0122
0.0132
0.0273
0.0355

Here again, we see the importance of the schedule variables. In particular, those
schedule variables that together sketch an image of where a program exists in RDT&E
and, in particular, EMD have the highest OI rankings. Again, the modification and the
major defense contractor identifier variables rank high on the list - three and four
respectively. Of the four other non-schedule variables, three fall at the end of the list.
We insert Figure 20 to give a perspective of the spread of the OI values for these
variables.
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Figure 20. Overall Importance of Predictors Models A and B
The 01 graph shows an overall exponential pattern, where the increasing Ol
values indicate decreasing relative importance of the variables in the models. From this
graph, we see the first four variables have almost indistinguishably low 01 values.
Variables five through eleven gently decrease in importance, and variables twelve
through fifteen escalate in 01 value (and down in relative importance) very quickly.
From these analyses of the model predictors, we gain an understanding of not only the
relative importance, but also the magnitude of the stratification of relative importance of
the various predictors for cost growth.
Chapter Summary
We analyze four families of models in this chapter, each with several generations
of sub models that differ in the number of variables used and the particular variables
used. From these subsets we select the best models for each number of variables and
compare them using statistical measures of accuracy and significance until we arrive at
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one best model for each family. We judge Models A.7, B.3, C.4, and D.4 as the best
models for each family of model, and then we compare these models with each other.
Our study reveals that A.7 and B.3 perform well in determining whether a program will
have cost growth and how much cost growth a program will have, respectively. We
include the computational forms of these models in Appendix C. C.4 and D.4 seem to
perform well, but their lack of conformity with underlying regression assumptions
renders the user incapable of accurately interpreting their results.
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V. Conclusions
Explanation of the Problem
Cost growth plagues major weapon systems in DoD. The cost estimator's
approach to handling cost growth involves increasing cost estimates with cost risk factors
to accommodate expected cost growth. Current means of estimating cost risk factors
ranges from quantifying expert opinions to developing cost estimating relationships
(CERs) from historical data. Reasonable people would agree that the best estimates of
cost growth in general come from relationships developed from recent, relevant, and
accurate, historical databases. Thus, we seek in this thesis to discover such relationships
from such a historical database using regression techniques. We use an approach not
found in our literary search: we disaggregate cost growth into separate components in
order to seek separate predictor variables for each part. Because this method entails
separate analysis for each of the seven SAR-defmed constituents of cost growth, this
approach has the potential to give more insight into the relationships of variables that
might predict cost growth than past research. It also creates the opportunity to build more
accurate models.
Limitations
Though we separate cost growth into its components, this study only addresses
one of the seven components of cost growth - engineering cost growth. In addition, we
only address cost growth in RDT&E dollars and only in the EMD phase of acquisition.
Finally, the resulting equations only apply within the range of data used to build them.
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Extrapolation beyond these bounds may produce nonsensical results, thus we advise
caution with such a use of the models.
Summary of Literature Review Results
A thorough study of recent literature pertaining to cost growth in major defense
acquisition systems supports the research of this document. Among the sources we
peruse, eleven studies serve to focus us on certain independent variables as candidate
predictor variables for cost growth. The scope of these studies differs from the scope of
our study in that none of these studies focus specifically on cost growth in the RDT&E
budget for the EMD phase. Given this difference in scope between this study and past
studies, we consider the applicability of the results of those past studies with an
appropriate degree of discretion. We develop from these studies a list of 78 candidate
predictor variables for use in this study.
Review of Methodologies
We extract our data from the SARs. In order to have a broad base of programs for
measuring the ability of various programs and to include the most accurate data without
going too far back in time, we gather all programs from all services that have EMD
SAR's recorded for the period 1990 through 2000. We convert all dollar amounts into a
common base year, and perform mathematical operations to arrive at predictor variables.
We compute our response variable, which we call Engineering % for programs. This
variable represents the total engineering cost variance in RDT&E dollars divided by the
total baseline cost of a program in RDT&E dollars. We convert amounts to base year
2000 dollars for all calculations.
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Once we create the database, our exploratory analysis reveals that the response
variable has a mixed distribution: a discrete mass representing a large proportion of the
data rests at the value zero, while the rest of the data has a continuous distribution. This
leads us to the conclusion that we must develop two models for predicting cost growth.
The first model, Model A, uses logistic regression to discriminate between those
programs that show cost growth and those that do not (grouped with the latter are those
programs that experience a negative cost variance). Given that a program experiences
cost growth, the second model, Model B, uses multiple regression to determine how
much cost growth will occur. At the start of our development of Model B, we find that
the response variable of those programs with cost growth has a lognormal distribution.
Thus, we transform the response variable via the natural log, and call this Model B. In
order to have a baseline to compare the natural log transformation with, we attempt the
regression without the transform and label this regression, Model C.
As a potential competitor with the two-step process of Models A and B, we
develop a third model, Model D. This model, because of the unusual distribution of the
response variable, defies all the assumptions of OLS regression. In fact, we attempt to
transform the model, but our attempts only exacerbate the assumption violations. Despite
its theoretical shortcomings, we investigate Model D to determine what conclusions, if
any, one might reach at its use. For all four models, we set aside approximately 20
percent of the data for validation and use the remaining 80 percent for model building.
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Restatement of Results
We find that a seven-variable model provides the best results for the logistic
regression. This model accurately predicts about 70 percent of the validation data. The
three-variable model provides the best prediction package for Model B. Models C and D
produce results that appear similar in effectiveness to Models A and B; however, these
models fail the assumptions of normality and constant variance of residuals. We attempt
to correct these shortcomings in Model D through several different transformations of the
response variable, but find the attempts futile. In addition to the assumption violations,
Model D has influential outliers that we cannot remove without creating more influential
outliers. Therefore, all models seem to perform well, but only A and B have statistically
valid results.
Our results not only establish a case for the applicability of logistic and Ytransformed multiple regression in cost growth analysis, but they also give insight into
program characteristics that can be useful to predict engineering cost growth. Overall,
the continuous schedule variables provide the most significance and appear more
frequently than most other variables. The modification identifier variable and the major
contractor identifier variable also perform with statistical significance and frequency that
rivals the schedule variables. By identifying predictors of cost growth and their
functional relationships to engineering cost growth, we add to contemporary insight into
the underlying drivers of engineering cost growth.
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Recommendations
Logistic regression provides unique abilities to the cost estimator previously
unexplored as far as we can tell from our research. It not only offers the ability to predict
whether a program will or will not experience cost growth (50 percent or more = Yes,
otherwise No), but also provides the estimator with an estimated probability that a certain
program will have cost growth. This allows the user to make predictions more or less
conservatively according to a certain percentage assurance desired. In addition to this
capability, logistic regression alleviates the estimator from the problematic situation of
trying to interpret a linear regression result that indicates the program will experience
some negative amount of cost growth within a prediction interval that might include both
a negative and a positive estimate.
Moreover, if the distribution of the Model B response variable (Engineering %)
does not represent an isolated incident, but rather represents a general trait of cost growth
databases, then logistic regression proves useful in estimating cost growth. The cost
estimating community should consider logistic regression a valid tool and explore its
usefulness in other situations where one can translate the response variable into a binary
response, rather than rely on OLS where its requisite assumptions will not hold.
In situations where an estimator knows cost growth exists, multiple regression
using Model B proves not only theoretically sound, but also demonstrates good point and
range estimating capabilities. The cost estimating community should look to this model
for estimating engineering cost growth. However, as mentioned earlier, models do not
yet exist to estimate the other components of cost growth, and until such time, this model
can have utility only in estimating cost growth due to engineering changes.
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In Figure 21 we suggest a possible mapping of the seven SAR-defmed categories
of cost growth to the three AFMC categories of risks included in cost estimates. Given
this mapping, this research provides for the foundation of the bulk of engineering risk for
RDT&E dollars in the EMD phase. Thus, we pave the way for the potential completion
of a historically based model in line with AFMC guidance.
SAR Cost Growth Category

AFMC Risk Category

Economic
Quantity

Cost Estimating Risk

Estimating
Other
Schedule

Schedule Risk

Engineering

-►

Technical Risk

Support

Figure 21. Possible Mapping of SAR Cost Growth to AFMC Risk Categories
Finally, we do not recommend using Models C and D. These models might seem
to have some practical ability to estimate cost growth based on their comparable results
with the other two models; however, without the underlying assumptions of regression,
the interpretations of the results of the models remain ambiguous, and we have no
confidence that the process will continue to give similar results over time.
Possible Follow-on Theses:
We encourage the exploitation of the database created during this research for
other research topics. We collect a wide range of data in order to develop the dozens of
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predictor variables explored in this research. Those same data points might prove useful
in research of other cost and programmatic areas. Here are some examples:
•

Identify programs that did not have significant overruns and
evaluate their risk estimating methodology to see if there is a best
methodology.

•

Accomplish what we did for procurement dollars in the EMD
phase.

•

Accomplish what we did for the PDRR and procurement phases
for both RDT&E and procurement dollars.

•

Look for a relationship between overruns and CARD inputs at the
time of the DE.

•

Analyze the distributions of the overruns across years and fit a
curve.
Look at the autocorrelation of cost growth in each of the four
categories of cost growth to see if a relationship exists (this might
be along the vane of curve fitting).
Create a program utilizing the CERs developed from the analysis.
Experiment with the sensitivity of the models we create to varying
inputs.
Explore the applicability of our results to the Monte Carlo
simulation technique of risk analysis.

120

Appendix A. Seven-Predictor Logistic Regression Model (Model A)
Nominal Logistic Fit for R&D Cost Growth?
Whole Model Test
Model

-LogLikelihood

Difference
Full
Reduced

DF ChiSquare Prot»ChiSq

25.298165
16.778665
42.076830

7

RSquare(U)
Observations (or Sum Wgts)

50.59633

<0001

0.6012
61

Converged by Gradient

Parameter Estimates
Term

Estimate

Intercept
Actual Length of EMD (MSIII-MSII in mos
MSIII-based Maturity of EMD %
RAND Modification?
Length of R&D in Funding Yrs
Length of Prod in Funding Yrs
Actual Length of EMD using (IOC-MSII in
Land Vehicle

9.89273712 3.0519881
-0.160053 0.0536555
-2.0396671 0.8368564
-4.7892385 1.6482829
-0.5050226 0.1630489
0.49725244
0.153934
0.0959051
0.039578
-4.8765107 1.9680859

For log odds of 0/1

Receiver Operating Characteristic
1.000.900.800.700.60o

Q.

Std Error ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq

0.50-0.400.300.200.100.00—
.00 .10 .20 .30 .40 .50 .60 .70 .80 .901.00
1-Specificity
False Positive

Area Under Curve = 0.94805
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10.51
8.90
5.94
8.44
9.59
10.43
5.87
6.14

0.0012
0.0029
0.0148
0.0037
0.0020
0.0012
0.0154
0.0132

Appendix B. Three-Predictor Y-Transformed Multiple Regression Model
(Model B)
Whole Model
Actual by Predicted Plot
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Summary of Fit
RSquare
RSquare Adj
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Wgts)

0.464491
0.422214
1.165613
-2.2173
42

Analysis of Variance
Source

DF

Sum of Squares

Mean Square

F Ratio

Model
Error
C. Total

3
38
41

44.781937
51.628864
96.410800

14.9273
1.3587

10.9868
^rob > F
<.0001

Pa ram et er Estimates
Term
Intercept
(A1) Maturity from MSII (current calcul
No Maj Def KTR
Prog Acq Unit Cost

Estimate

Std Error

t Ratio

Prob>|t|

VIF

-3.38629
0.0073665
1.3542639
-0.000738

0.413
0.002577
0.415987
0.000373

-8.20
2.86
3.26
-2.12

<.0001
0.0069
0.0024
0.0410

1.1107256
1.0340835
1.0786379
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Appendix C. Computational Forms of Models A and B

Computational Form of Model A

Y-lntercept

9.892737

Coefficients

-0.160053
-2.0396671
-4.7892385
-0.5050226
0.4972524
0.0959051
-4.8765107

Input X Values
Below:

174
95%
0
26
18
234
0

Predictor Variable

Actual Length of EMD (MSIII-MSII in mos)
MSIII-based Maturity of EMD %
RAND Modification? (1=Yes, 0=No)
Length of R&D in Funding Yrs
Length of Prod in Funding Yrs
Actual Length of EMD using (IOC-MSII in mos)
Land Vehicle (1=Yes, 0=No)

0.836018 Probability of Cost Growth

Computational Form of Model B

Y-lntercept

-3.38629

Coefficients

0.0073665
1.3542639
-0.000788

Input X Values
Below:

Predictor Variable

36 Maturity from MSII (in mos)
0 No Maj Def KTR
0.22 PAUC (in $M)

0.044101 Estimated Cost Growth $M
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